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ABSTRACT 
An Empirical Investigation of Depressive Rumination: Implications for Cognitive Flexibility, Problem 
Solving and Depression  
Elizabeth M. Goetter 
Evan M. Forman, Ph.D. 
James D. Herbert, Ph.D. 
Lauren B. Alloy, Ph.D.  
David DeMatteo, J.D., Ph.D. 
 
Depressive rumination, or thinking about the causes and implications of one’s depression, is a 
maladaptive form of repetitive thinking. According to cognitive theories of depression, rumination 
exacerbates depression because it increases the accessibility of negative schemas, disrupts the individual’s 
social support networks, and inhibits instrumental skills behaviors and qualities of cognition, such as 
problem-solving and cognitive flexibility, respectively. Although research has supported a relationship 
between rumination and problem solving, rumination and cognitive flexibility, and cognitive flexibility and 
problem solving, no study has examined all three in the context of a single analysis. The current study 
sought (1) to examine if cognitive inflexibility mediates the relationship between rumination and poor 
problem solving, and (2) to determine if mindfulness (i.e., present moment awareness and nonjudgmental 
acceptance) and psychological distancing (i.e., defusion or decentering) might buffer ruminators’ 
tendencies toward cognitive inflexibility (operationalized as performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test). Participants were 97 undergraduate students from a large, metropolitan university. Results failed to 
find support for preliminary hypotheses.  Results suggest that rumination exerts a negative impact on 
problem solving for individuals with average to low levels of depression, but that rumination may have a 
beneficial impact on task performance for individuals with higher levels of depression. Consistent with the 
analytical rumination hypothesis, focusing on one’s depressive symptoms, in a structured clinical context 
(and preventing degradation into pathological, repetitive though), may encourage problem-focused coping 
for those with moderate depression. Post hoc analyses suggest that psychological distancing strategies 
attenuate the relationship between rumination and depression. These findings suggest that psychological 
distancing strategies may be beneficial for ruminators because of their protective role in decreasing 
depressive symptoms. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Repetitive Thought 
People respond to distress in a variety of ways. The process by which an individual responds to a 
stressful stimulus, with the goal of diminishing, tolerating, or mastering the associated physical, emotional, 
and psychological burden, has been termed coping (1980; Pearlin & Schooler, 1978). People engage in a 
variety of adaptive and maladaptive coping behaviors. An individual might abuse substances, go for a run, 
injure him/herself, or engage in a spiritual exercise. An individual might also cope with distress by 
thinking. 
In the current psychological literature, there are many conceptualizations of thinking in response to 
subjective distress and external stress. Coping in a cognitive manner is adaptive in many situations and can 
lead to effective problem solving. Cognitive coping can also revert to maladaptive, highly repetitive 
thinking. Maladaptive repetitive thinking is at the foundation of many models of psychopathology 
(Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003). The ubiquitous nature of disordered thought, in addition 
to the varying theoretical perspectives of those who study it, have given rise to numerous concepts that 
have distinct and overlapping features. These numerous concepts (e.g., rumination, worry, perseveration, 
counterfactual thinking) fall under the broad heading of “repetitive thought” and are associated with both 
adaptive and maladaptive consequences. Repetitive thought has been described as a “process of thinking 
attentively, repetitively, or frequently about oneself and one’s world” (Segerstrom, et al., 2003, p. 909). 
This process is endemic to the human experience and is something in which individuals engage with 
varying frequency and degree. 
1.2. Rumination 
Rumination is one example of repetitive thought and has been broadly described as repeatedly and 
analytically thinking about the causes and implications of both internal and external realities. Recently, 
rumination has been primarily researched in the context of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 1991, 
2004). Rumination has also been examined as a function of self-regulation and metacognition (i.e., thinking 
about thinking, Matthews & Wells, 2004; Wells & Matthews, 1996) and goal progress (L. L. Martin, 
Shrira, & Startup, 2004; L. L. Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996). To assist the reader in understanding the 
distinction between these theories, it is necessary to discuss specific models of rumination in more detail. 
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1.2.1. The Self-Regulatory Executive Function Model 
According to Matthews and Wells’ Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model, 
rumination is not limited to depression and refers to “repetitive thoughts generated by attempts to cope with 
self-discrepancy” (i.e., competing perceptions of an ideal and actual self) that are directed toward 
processing information related to one’s thoughts and feelings and not toward immediate goal-directed 
action (Matthews & Wells, 2004, p. 131). These researchers further posit that an individual engages in 
rumination because of positive beliefs (metacognitions) that rumination will help him/her solve his/her 
emotional dilemma. However, according to Matthews and Wells (2004, p. 132), “rumination is emotion-
focused coping masquerading as problem-focused” coping. Said another way, the ruminator may believe 
that he/she is changing the root of the problem, when in actuality the individual’s rumination is an indirect 
and ineffective approach to fix the situation. Although the individual may believe that, by engaging in 
rumination, he/she is problem-solving and alleviating his/her distress, he/she is actually exacerbating 
his/her symptoms.  
Thus, rumination persists because the individual makes a positive, metacognitive appraisal that the 
rumination will be beneficial and solve his/her dilemma. Positive beliefs about the benefits of rumination 
(i.e., “ruminating about my depression helps me to understand past mistakes and failures”) may explain the 
repetitive nature of rumination and explain why ruminators continue to engage in this behavior despite not 
being associated with positive outcomes (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003).  
1.2.2. Goal Progress Theory of Rumination 
Rumination has also been researched in the context of goal progress (L. L. Martin, et al., 2004; L. 
L. Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996). Specifically, when individuals do not receive clear feedback that they are 
progressing toward some goal or set of goals, they engage in mental activities (or ruminations) in effort to 
obtain feedback (L. L. Martin & Tesser, 1989). These researchers argue that failure to reach an important 
goal activates mental activity (i.e., rumination) that persists until the individual meets the goal or abandons 
its pursuit (L. L. Martin, Tesser, & McIntosh, 1993). For example, a student wishing to get into medical 
school may begin to repetitively think about the direction of her life after failing the MCAT. Rumination is 
defined as “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around a common instrumental theme and recur in 
the absence of immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts” (L. L. Martin & Tesser, 1996, p. 
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1). Martin and his colleagues (2004) describe rumination as existing in part because of the Zeigarnik effect, 
named for the Russian psychologist who noted that individuals remember information related to incomplete 
tasks more easily than information related to completed tasks (Zeigarnik, 1938). By keeping goals in one’s 
awareness, rumination functions to assist in problem solving and the ultimate achievement of the 
individual’s objective. Thus, rumination occurs in a repetitive fashion until the goal is attained or the 
individual resigns herself to not achieving the goal. 
1.2.3. The Response Styles Theory of Rumination 
A third theory of depressive rumination – or repetitive thought surrounding depression itself – 
arose from Susan Nolen-Hoeksema’s empirical attempts to explain gender differences in depression. 
Today, Nolen-Hoeksema’s response styles theory of rumination remains the most well known and well-
researched (see Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wilsco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). In 
contrast to other theories of rumination, which posit that ruminators are attempting to cope with 
discrepancies between perceptions of an ideal and actual self or a failure to achieve valued ends, the 
response styles theory claims that ruminators are focusing on information relevant to their depressive 
symptoms and the implications of these symptoms (e.g., “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of 
this”). Within response styles theory, individuals are seen as having trait-like styles of responding to 
depressed mood (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008). One way of responding, rumination, 
is the repetitive and passive thinking about one’s depressive symptoms and the possible causes and 
consequences of such symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008). Examples of rumination would include 
thoughts such as: What’s wrong with me? Why can’t I get moving? and I don’t think I’ll ever get out of this. 
An assumption of this theory is that these thoughts are not focused on resolving the problems associated 
with the individual’s ruminations. Rather, the ruminations are passive and leave individuals in a cyclical 
and unproductive process (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004). The process occurs repeatedly because of the self-
perpetuating nature of rumination (i.e., an individual chooses to persist in ruminating because he 
underestimates the amount of pleasure he might experience engaging in a pleasant, distracting activity, his 
mood worsens, and he responds by ruminating further) (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). 
Additionally, some researchers have suggested that depressive rumination occurs repetitively because the 
individual is attempting to cope with uncertainty (Ward, Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) 
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or gain a better understanding of him/herself (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Unfortunately, by 
engaging in this behavior, ruminators often become fixated on their problems and do not actively behave in 
a way that might actually change their circumstances (Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008). 
Nolen-Hoeksema (2004) proposes that depression is exacerbated by rumination because 
rumination increases negative thought content, inhibits effective problem solving and other instrumental 
skills behavior, and disrupts the individual’s social support networks. Experimental studies have 
demonstrated that rumination is associated with difficulty initiating adaptive behaviors, like problem 
solving and the implementation of solutions to these problems (Ward, et al., 2003). Rumination has also 
been associated with a decrease in willingness to engage in pleasant or distracting activities (Lyubomirsky 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993), an increase in the intensity and frequency of negative emotions (Swinkels & 
Giuliano, 1995), a higher likelihood of experiencing suicidal ideation (Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007), 
and lower levels of cognitive flexibility (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). This response style is seen 
more frequently among women and is one explanation for the higher rates of unipolar depression seen 
among them, in comparison to their male counterparts. Further, rumination is conceptualized as a stable, 
characteristic way of responding even among those with changing depressive symptoms (Bagby, Rector, 
Bacchiochi, & McBride, 2004; Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993). Although the origin of this response style is likely 
to be a combination of biological (e.g., genetics) and environmental (e.g., sex-roles) factors, its roots are 
unknown. However, researchers have concluded that responding to feelings of depression in this manner 
(i.e., passively ruminating) is associated with psychological dysfunction. It has been posited that rumination 
is a response to depressed affect and ultimately can prolong or exacerbate feelings of depression, 
suggesting that there may be a bidirectional relationship between rumination and depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, et al., 2008).  
1.2.4. A Clinical Vignette 
The following hypothetical example illustrates the tenets of these three theories of rumination.  Jill 
is a 22-year-old nursing student who recently performed poorly on a qualifying exam. She has been 
dwelling on the events surrounding her poor performance and repetitively thinking about her study 
strategies, her poor performance on the exam, and the fact that she must now retake the test. She has 
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noticed that she is constantly thinking about these things and these thoughts are interfering with her ability 
to concentrate and enjoy other activities. She has experienced an increase in affective distress. According to 
the Self-Regulatory Executive Function Model, Jill’s repetitive thinking (ruminating) is an attempt to cope 
with the discrepancy between her poor test performance and her self-perception as a good student. She will 
continue to think about her performance and process information that reminds her of her recent academic 
setback because of a belief, perhaps implicit or unconscious, that such thinking will help her ameliorate her 
distress and help her perform better in the future. According to Goal Progress Theory, Jill will ruminate 
because her goal, successfully completing her nursing program, has been threatened by recent feedback 
(poor performance) that is inconsistent with and undermines her progress toward this goal. Additionally, 
these ruminations will persist in situations and contexts that do not require her to think about her 
performance, for example while she is enjoying dinner with her friends. According to Response Styles 
Theory, Jill’s ruminations (e.g., How did this happen? and I’m never going to finish this program) will 
persist because Jill believes they will help her find meaning in her feelings, better understand herself, and 
be more beneficial than engaging in an alternative, more enjoyable activity (e.g., phoning a friend). 
Unfortunately, for Jill, these thoughts are unproductive and are not focused on providing a solution to her 
current predicament. These ruminations will exacerbate and maintain her current feelings of anxiety and 
depression because the negative content of her thoughts has increased and her ability to effectively solve 
this academic problem has decreased. Additionally, her social support is being eroded because her 
ruminations are preventing her from fully engaging in her interpersonal relationships, for example, while 
eating dinner with her friends. 
1.2.5. Unifying Themes 
Several definitions of rumination have been proposed and offer differing explanations for why 
individuals initiate and maintain a ruminative style. Though each definition and accompanying theoretical 
explanation provides unique perspectives, unifying themes emerge. Rumination is, first and foremost, a 
cognitive activity that requires attention and focus (L. L. Martin & Tesser, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987a, 1987b; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Wells 
& Matthews, 1996). Moreover, it is a cognitive activity in which the ruminator becomes immersed. It has 
been suggested that self-focused rumination could lead to memory impairment under conditions that permit 
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the individual to mind-wander (Hertel, 1998). Rumination has also been shown to inhibit concentration and 
performance on academic-related tasks (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003). Rumination is a mental, 
thought-based activity requiring one’s internal attention. 
Secondly, rumination is a repetitive process (Calmes & Roberts, 2007; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, 
& Craske, 2000; Watkins, 2008). All individuals experience thoughts that are negative in content. In fact, 
some would argue that verbal thought content is more likely to be negative because language evolved as an 
adaptive function to signal danger. However, despite this evolutionary “advantage,” not every individual 
who has ever harbored a negative thought would be considered a ruminator. Rumination is a process that 
occurs in a repetitive and unrelenting manner. It may occur as a result of perceived discrepancies between 
an actual and ideal self, as a method to gain feedback toward the progression of some goal, or as a response 
to feelings of depression. In spite of the differences among these proposals, researchers would likely agree 
that rumination is a repetitive and negatively-valenced activity requiring mental attention and focus. 
Finally, rumination is typically conceptualized as containing negative themes (see Thomsen, 2006 
for a review). Trappnell and Campbell (1999) argue that rumination is motivated by threats and losses, and 
Wells and Matthews (1994) describe the content of rumination as consisting of loss and failure. And even if 
rumination is not self-focused, Papageorgiou and Wells (2001) posit that individuals can ruminate about 
negative realities, e.g., famine in developing nations. However, this last characteristic of rumination has 
recently been questioned by researchers, who argue that rumination can also be characterized by positive 
themes (Feldman, Joorman, & Johnson, 2008; Gruber, Harvey, & Johnson, 2009; Johnson, McKenzie, & 
McMurrich, 2008). For example, one study found that individuals with bipolar disorder were significantly 
more likely to ruminate in response to positive affect than those with no history of mania (Johnson, et al., 
2008). Still another study found that ruminating about positive mood states was more frequent among those 
with vulnerability to mania relative to those with low vulnerability to experiencing a manic episode 
(Feldman, et al., 2008).  
Thus, to unify these theories of rumination, one can conclude that rumination is (1) a cognitive 
activity in which one becomes immersed and (2) a repetitive activity that persists in a manner that is 
cyclical and difficult to suppress. 
7 
1.2.6. Consequences of Rumination 
Though people engage and persist in rumination for a variety of reasons, there is a large body of 
evidence suggesting that the maladaptive consequences of rumination far outweigh its benefits. Rumination 
maintains and exacerbates feelings of depression (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990) and is associated with decreases in one’s willingness to engage in pleasant or distracting activities 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Rumination has also been associated with alcohol abuse in 
adults (Nolen-Hoeksema & Harrell, 2002) and adolescent females (Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & 
Bohon, 2007), bulimia nervosa, and nonsuicidal self-injury (Hilt, Cha, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008). 
Rumination has also been shown to be a predictor of suicidal ideation (Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007; 
Smith, Alloy, & Abramson, 2006). Further, rumination is associated with poor problem solving (Donaldson 
& Lam, 2004; Kao, Dritschel, & Astell, 2006; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky, 
Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999; Strack, Blaney, Ganellen, & Coyne, 1985), which was a focus of the 
current investigation. 
1.3. Problem Solving 
Problem solving is a higher order function that is necessary for the effective and appropriate 
navigation of one’s world. Effective problem solving is dependent upon an individual’s ability to plan, 
initiate appropriate behaviors, make decisions and test hypotheses (Fossati, Ergis, & Allilaire, 2001). There 
is a well-established link between depression and impaired problem solving. Likewise, many studies have 
also documented a relationship between rumination and impaired problem solving.  
1.3.1. Problem Solving and Depression 
Psychological research has demonstrated an association between depressive symptoms and 
impaired problem solving ability (Beck, 1976; Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992; Mitchell & Madigan, 
1984; Nezu, 1987; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). This relationship has been largely investigated in the adult 
literature, but impaired problem-solving has also been observed among children with higher levels of 
depressive symptomatology (Mullins, Siegel, & Hodges, 1985; Sacco & Graves, 1984). Additionally, 
evidence suggests that depression is associated with both interpersonal problem solving difficulties and 
circumscribed problem-solving task deficits (i.e., anagrams). For example, Mitchell and Madigan (1984) 
randomly assigned participants into one of three mood-induction conditions, depressed, neutral, or elated. 
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They found that even if individuals had no history of interpersonal problem-solving skills deficits, 
dysphoric symptoms were associated with poorer outcomes on a measure that assessed interpersonal 
problem-solving ability. Another study demonstrated that compared with control participants, dysphoric 
participants demonstrated poorer performance on a fault-diagnosis task (a problem-solving task that 
requires individuals to test potentially faulty units and use the feedback to identify which unit is faulty) 
(Channon & Baker, 1996). A series of experiments conducted by Strack and his colleagues (1985) found 
that depressed individuals took a significantly longer period of time when solving anagram tasks compared 
to their nondepressed counterparts. They also found that, among nondepressed participants, increasing self-
focus and lowering expectancy resulted in poorer performance on the anagram problem-solving task. 
Among depressed participants, these researchers found that increasing expectancy and lowering self-focus 
attenuated performance, resulting in faster mean times to task completion. It is important to note that 
though the self-focusing task was not a rumination induction, rumination is often a self-focused activity 
among depressed individuals. These studies provide support for a relationship between depression and 
problem-solving deficits and a relationship between self-focus (a component of rumination) and impaired 
problem solving. However, recently, researchers have pointed out that the relationship between depression 
and problem solving may not be so straightforward (see Andrews & Thomson, 2009 for a recent review). 
These researchers argue that depression itself may be an evolved response that assists in solving complex 
problems (i.e., those problems that are related to the depression). Conversely, as discussed in the 
aforementioned paragraphs, a large body of evidence suggests that depression is associated with impaired 
performance. However other studies have concluded that dysphoric mood improves analytical skills and 
improves performance on complex tasks (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Braverman, 2005; Forgas, 1998; 
Gasper & Clore, 2002). Scientific evidence has not fully clarified the relationship between depression and 
problem solving, however it appears that depression has at least some negative implications for problem 
solving. 
1.3.2. Problem Solving and Rumination 
Rumination is conceptualized as increasing depressive symptoms, in part because of its 
detrimental effect on problem solving (Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008). In their examination of the 
relationship between rumination and problem solving, Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) 
9 
randomly assigned  dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals (based on naturally occurring differences on 
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory) to either a rumination condition or distracting condition (i.e., a 
mood induction) in order to examine the interaction between mood and rumination vs. distraction on 
problem-solving ability. Dysphoric individuals who were induced to ruminate demonstrated significantly 
less effective problem-solving skills compared to the other three groups, who were not significantly 
different from one another. Thus, a state form of rumination among dysphoric individuals was associated 
with poorer problem solving ability. Another study examined the association between rumination and 
problem solving among depressed and nondepressed adults (Donaldson & Lam, 2004). Participants 
completed measures of mood and problem solving prior to receiving either a rumination or distraction 
induction. Prior to the induction, it was found that trait rumination significantly predicted problem-solving 
performance. Following the induction, it was demonstrated that depressed individuals who were made to 
ruminate (i.e., experienced a state form of rumination) generated less effective solutions to problems. This 
relationship did not exist among nondepressed individuals. A notable study by Watkins and Baracaia 
(2002)compared depressed, recovered depressed, and never depressed individuals on a social problem-
solving task. Within each group, individuals were randomly assigned to one of three conditions as a method 
of inducing individuals to think about the problem: (a) process focused questions (e.g., How am I deciding 
what to do?), (b) state-oriented questions (e.g., How can I understand this? What am I doing wrong?), and 
(c) no questions. Both currently and recovering depressed individuals in the state-oriented questions 
condition demonstrated poorer problem solving than the never depressed individuals in the same condition. 
The authors argued that state-oriented questions increased individuals’ self-focus and ruminative response 
style. This study further supports the notion that a state form of rumination coupled with a preexisting 
depressed mood or history of depressed mood is associated with poor problem solving skills. This 
manipulation was associated with greater impairment on the social problem-solving task.  
Finally, a quasi-experimental study conducted by Ward and colleagues (2003) examined how 
ruminators and nonruminators differed in their abilities to generate viable solutions to intricate problems 
(e.g., how to revise campus housing plan, how to revise a college curriculum). Individuals with stable (trait-
like) ruminative tendencies were less confident about and satisfied with their solutions. Additionally, they 
reported being less likely to actually commit to such solutions. 
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To summarize, several studies have demonstrated a relationship between depression, trait and state 
rumination, and impaired problem solving. Though the literature has not been entirely clear on the 
distinction between trait and state forms of rumination, it appears that trait rumination detrimentally 
impacts problem solving and that state forms of rumination (i.e., rumination inductions) have negative 
implications for problem solving among already dysphoric or depressed individuals. 
Even though ruminators may appraise their repetitive thoughts as beneficial to the problem solving 
process (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003) experimental studies have shown that among dysphoric and 
depressed individuals, rumination decreases problem solving ability beyond what deficits could be 
attributed to depressive symptoms (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Lyubomirsky, et al., 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008). Theoretically, it is suggested that rumination’s 
impact on depressive symptom severity is partially due to its direct effect on rumination. However, 
statistically and experimentally, the temporal relationship between these variables has not been clearly 
established. Prior research has focused on the way in which rumination impacts problem solving, but it has 
not been conclusively demonstrated that problem solving difficulties do not also increase ruminative 
thoughts. For example, It has been suggested that dysphoric rumination may reduce energy and motivation, 
thus interfering with the individual’s ability to solve his/her problems (Lyubomirsky, et al., 1999). Yet, it is 
possible that as these problems remain unsolved, the individual feels it necessary to continue ruminating 
about his/her dysphoric symptoms, thus changing the direction of this relationship (Watkins & Moulds, 
2005). For example, within the self-regulatory model and the goal-progress theory, rumination occurs as a 
way to cope with a problem (discrepancy, lack of goal attainment). According to these theories, if the 
problem remained unsolved, it would trigger further ruminations in an attempt to resolve the problem. 
Though the research has yet to disentangle the direction of this relationship, it is likely that these variables 
have a synergistic effect, adding to the complexity of these constructs. Furthermore, the clinician should 
not lose sight of the fact that therapeutic intervention would likely be similar regardless of the direction of 
the causal relationship. However, based on a review of prior research and current theoretical understanding 
of these constructs, the current study conceptualized the model in terms of rumination leading to problem 
solving deficits. At this point, researchers have suggested that rumination explains, at least in part, why 
depressed individuals have difficulty problem solving and that depressive symptoms become exacerbated 
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by these problem solving deficits (Kao, et al., 2006; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2002). Moreover, it begs the question of whether there may be a third, mediating variable 
between rumination and problem solving impairment. One variable that might potentially mediate the 
relationship between rumination and poor problem solving is cognitive flexibility. 
1.4. Cognitive Flexibility 
 Effective problem solving is a product of executive functioning in humans; it is our ability to 
problem-solve, both concretely and abstractly, that assists us in navigating our environment. Executive 
functions include inhibition, planning, organizing, dealing with novel situations, and set shifting, or 
cognitive flexibility. 
Cognitive flexibility has been described as “a hallmark of human cognition” and refers to one’s 
“ability to consider simultaneously multiple conflicting representations of a single object or event” (Jacques 
& Zelazo, 2005, p. 54). Others have defined cognitive flexibility as one’s ability to “inhibit a dominant 
response when it represents a nonoptimal or inappropriate solution to a problem, and to enable access to 
more remote alternatives” (Alexander, Hillier, Smith, Tivarus, & Beversdorf, 2007). Put simply, cognitive 
flexibility is what enables an individual to inhibit a strong response preference so that he/she can consider 
alternative solutions (Beversdorf, Hughes, Steinberg, Lewis, & Heilman, 1999; Silver, Hughes, Bornstein, 
& Beversdorf, 2004). Unlike creativity, cognitive flexibility requires that the individual abandon the 
dominant response, not for the sensation of a novel experience, but because it is no longer appropriate or 
effective to respond in that way. 
Cognitive flexibility is an aspect of executive functioning.  These executive functions describe a 
set of inter-related skills that are necessary for problem-solving, creativity, and goal achievement (Catroppa 
& Anderson, 2006). Specifically, cognitive flexibility is a necessary method for solving problems that 
require solutions based on information that has not been previously acquired (Beversdorf, et al., 1999). 
1.4.1. Cognitive Flexibility and Psychopathology 
Psychopathology has been associated with impaired cognitive flexibility. In a study examining a 
sample of outpatients with schizophrenia, individuals with higher levels of cognitive flexibility were better 
able to provide appropriate solutions to social problem-solving vignettes (Hatashita-Wong, Smith, 
Silverstein, Hull, & Willson, 2002). This association has also been demonstrated in pediatric populations. 
12 
Among children, impaired cognitive flexibility has been associated with a decreased ability to tolerate 
frustration and solve problems (Greene & Ablon, 2006). 
Further, numerous studies have demonstrated a link between depressive symptoms, rumination, 
executive impairment, and cognitive rigidity (Austin, Ross, O'Carrol, Ebmeier, & Goodwin, 1992; 
Channon, 1996; Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; M. M. Grant, Thase, & Sweeney, 2001; Kindermann, 
Kalayam, Brown, Burdick, & Alexopoulos, 2000; D. J. Martin, Oren, & Boone, 1991; Mayberg, et al., 
1999; Merriam, Thase, Haas, Keshavan, & Sweeney, 1999; Schotte & Clum, 1987; Watkins & Brown, 
2002). A brief summary of the literature indicates that depression and dysphoric symptoms are associated 
with hypoactive executive function and cognitive rigidity. Additionally, as discussed above, depression and 
dysphoria are associated with the presence of rumination. Studies have also demonstrated a link between 
rumination and inflexible cognitive styles. Specifically, studies have shown that both individuals who are 
depressed and individuals who ruminate perform more poorly on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST). The WCST requires individuals to match a stimulus card, which contains various shapes, to one 
of several “category” cards. The individual matches these cards according to one of three rules: color, 
number, and type of shape on the cards. After the individual successfully sorts a certain number of cards, 
the rules switch without the individual’s knowledge. The WCST is an instrument designed to measure an 
individual’s ability to shift sets, and is one of the most well-known measures of cognitive flexibility 
(Austin, et al., 1992; Axelrod, Goldman, Tompkins, & Jiron, 1994; Channon, 1996; Davis & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; Merriam, et al., 1999). Some researchers have found a relationship between depressed 
symptomatology and poor performance on the WCST, suggesting cognitive flexibility impairments 
(Austin, et al., 1992; Channon, 1996; M. M. Grant, et al., 2001; Kindermann, et al., 2000; Merriam, et al., 
1999). Others have failed to find a significant relationship between dysphoric symptoms and cognitive 
flexibility, possibly because of small sample sizes and the effects of a significantly higher verbal IQ among 
control participants (Fossati, Amar, Raoux, Ergis, & Allilaire, 1999; D. J. Martin, et al., 1991).  
Although the research has been mixed regarding the relationship between depressive symptoms 
and cognitive flexibility, one study demonstrated a direct relationship between depressive rumination and 
cognitive inflexibility (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Undergraduate students who demonstrated high 
trait rumination performed significantly poorer on the WSCT when compared to students demonstrating 
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low trait rumination, indicating a higher frequency of cognitively inflexible styles among ruminators. Other 
investigators have suggested that while ruminators do have difficulty switching sets, it is their difficulty in 
inhibiting previously relevant tasks (not set switching per se) that is implicated in executive function 
impairments (Whitmer & Banich, 2007).  
The current study proposed that cognitive inflexibility may explain, at least in part, the 
relationship between rumination and problem-solving deficits. Rumination may reflect a tendency toward 
perseveration (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Hertel, 1998), which by definition is an inability to 
flexibly adapt behavior when necessary (Lezak, 1995). Thus, it may be that persistent, unproductive mental 
activity is associated with a perseverative (i.e., inflexible) style, which is then associated with difficulty 
generating alternate cognitive appraisals and switching away from persistent negative thoughts or mood 
states (Crews & Harrison, 1995).  This in turn gives rise to problem-solving difficulties and trouble finding 
different ways to cope with one’s situation. One of the aims of the current study was to assess whether 
cognitive inflexibility mediates the relationship between rumination and poor problem solving. A second 
aim of the present study was to examine whether this relationship is attenuated by defusion, i.e., an 
individual’s ability to distance oneself from internal, private events. Specifically, the current study sought 
to examine whether defusion moderates the relationship between rumination and cognitive inflexibility and 
the relationship between rumination and problem solving impairments.  
1.5. Defusion 
 Like rumination, defusion has been researched under differing theoretical frameworks and 
described under various labels (e.g., distancing, decentering, metacognitive awareness). Simply put, 
defusion is a way to put psychological space between oneself and one’s experience. Some of the most 
recent research in this area has been conducted in the context of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT; S. C. Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) and its associated Relational Frame Theory (RFT; S. C. 
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). As such, the current study uses the term defusion, which refers to 
an individual’s psychological distancing from the language-based nature of private events. Following is a 
brief overview of ACT and RFT to provide a context for the present research. 
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1.5.1. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
The last twenty years have witnessed an increase in the research and development of mindfulness-
based cognitive behavior therapies (Forman & Herbert, 2009; Herbert, Forman, & England, 2009). One of 
the characteristic features of these interventions is their focus, not on directly modifying psychological 
events, but on changing the function of these events and the individual’s relationship to these events (S. C. 
Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). Perhaps the prototypical mindfulness-based intervention is 
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; S. C. Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999). The goal of ACT is to 
increase psychological flexibility within the context of a value-guided life (Blackledge & Hayes, 2001; 
Fletcher & Hayes, 2005). Six core processes underlie the ACT method and contribute to fostering 
psychological flexibility. These six processes include psychological acceptance, defusion, enhancing a 
content-free sense of self, contact with the present moment, values, and committed action (S. C. Hayes, 
Strosahl, Bunting, Twohig, & Wilson, 2004; S. C. Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999). 
1.5.2. Functional Contextualism 
ACT has its philosophical roots in functional contextualism, a specific branch of contextualistic 
philosophy (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; S. C. Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988; S. C. Hayes, et al., 2006). 
Contextualism, in psychology, refers to the notion that the actions of any individual interact in and with 
contexts that are both situationally and historically defined (S. C. Hayes, et al., 2006). According to Hayes 
and colleagues (1988), this notion is also reminiscent of functional and behavioristic positions: “We cannot 
account for the behavior of any system while staying wholly inside it; eventually we must turn to forces 
operating upon the organism from without” (Skinner, 1953, p. 35). Contextualism is a pragmatic 
philosophy that is reflected in ACT, which focuses on the workability of behavior and emphasizes the role 
of values in determining such workability.   
1.5.3. Relational Frame Theory 
In theoretical terms, ACT is based on the theory of language and cognition called Relational 
Frame Theory (RFT; S. C. Hayes, et al., 2001). RFT is based on the notion that language is rooted in bi-
directional stimulus relations that affect the functions of other events that are in the similar relational 
networks (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004). RFT states that the core of human cognition and 
language is “the learned and contextually controlled ability to arbitrarily relate events mutually and in 
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combination, and to change the functions of specific events based on their relations to others” (S. C. Hayes, 
et al., 2006, p. 5). Three important features of RFT include (a) cognition is one kind of learned behavior, 
(b) cognition changes the effects of other behaviors, and (c) the relations and functions of cognitions are 
affected by the context of the situation in which they occur. From these characteristics emerge four primary 
clinical implications. First, a human’s ability to use language to problem-solve and reason is largely 
functional, and once developed cannot be eliminated. Unfortunately, psychopathology stems, in part, from 
some of the same aspects of language that make it so useful. Moreover, it is impossible to eliminate these 
processes completely. Second, eliminating or stifling cognitive networks and associations, though 
seemingly logical in the face of psychological dysfunction, is a futile endeavor because these networks are 
byproducts of one’s learning and experience. Stemming from this notion is a third implication for the 
clinical arena. Attempting to directly change or alter these networks only elaborates these networks making 
them of greater functional importance, not less. Finally, the content and impact of these networks are 
controlled by the context in which they occur. Thus, it follows that the impact of cognitions (i.e., thoughts) 
can be reduced regardless of the form in which they occur. These features and characteristics proposed by 
Hayes and colleagues (S. C. Hayes, et al., 2006) culminate in the primary goal of an ACT intervention, 
which is not symptom reduction per se, but a change in the function of these bi-directional relations in the 
service of personally relevant values.   
1.5.4. Defusion Defined 
An important tenet of RFT is that bi-directional relationships and their functions are influenced by 
the context in which they occur. Because of these relationships, RFT concludes that verbal events can be 
altered by changing the literal context in which these verbal activities occur (Masuda, et al., 2004). This 
process is one form of defusion. Technically speaking, defusion refers to the process of undermining the 
language-based processes that allow private experiences to get in the way of value-driven living 
(Blackledge, 2007; S. C. Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999). Cognitive defusion allows one to gain psychological 
distance from his/her private experiences and persist in behaviors that are consistent with his/her values. 
Although there has been a lack of component analyses examining the distinct and overlapping contributions 
of the different core processes in ACT, defusion has been associated with adaptive outcomes for a variety 
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of psychological problems (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Bond & Bunce, 2000; Forman, Herbert, Moitra, 
Yeomans, & Geller, 2007; Masuda, et al., 2004).  
It should be noted that ACT techniques that seek to foster defusion do not always produce a 
decrease in symptomatology (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006). Rather, it has been argued 
that such techniques tend to be associated with less believability of negative thoughts, a greater acceptance 
of discomfort, and a greater willingness to experience negative feelings, all in the service of more effective 
behavioral action (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006; S. C. Hayes, Bissett, et al., 1999; 
Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004; Masuda, et al., 2004; Slinger & Dobson, 2007; Zettle & Hayes, 
1987).  
1.5.5. Defusion and its Relation to Rumination and Cognitive Flexibility 
Although rumination and cognitive fusion are related they are not synonymous. To some degree, 
rumination involves an immersion in cognitions, that is, thinking about one’s thoughts and feelings. This 
immersion is similar to cognitive fusion, or an individual’s complete identification with and belief in 
his/her thoughts.  However, because defusion does not imply symptom reduction, it is theoretically possible 
that an individual could demonstrate ruminative behaviors, but demonstrate less fusion to these thoughts. 
To illustrate that defusion does not equate with a lessening of symptoms, consider a study by Bach and 
Hayes (2002), which compared the effects of ACT versus treatment as usual on rehospitalization rates for 
individuals with positive psychotic symptoms (which, for the purpose of drawing a parallel, can be thought 
of as a cognitive manifestation of pathology, similar to rumination). At follow up, individuals in the ACT 
condition, though more likely to report psychotic symptoms, were three times more likely to stay out of the 
hospital. The researchers concluded that individuals in the ACT condition were less likely to be 
rehospitalized – not because of reduced symptoms, reduced distress, or better medication adherence – but 
because of increased acceptance and reduced cognitive fusion (with the between group results supporting 
the conclusion that cognitive defusion played a larger role for those in the ACT condition). Thus, although 
individuals were still experiencing hallucinations and/or delusions, they were less likely to live as though 
they were true, presumably because they were more defused from their psychotic experiences. Though this 
study did not examine rumination, an important conclusion is worth emphasizing: individuals experienced 
an increase in psychopathology (i.e., psychotic symptoms) and a simultaneous increase in cognitive 
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defusion. Defusion was not positively related to a reduction in a cognitive form of psychopathology. 
Similarly, it is proposed that rumination is not synonymous with fusion to thoughts; not only is it 
theoretically possible that ruminating individuals might be able to achieve psychological distance from 
their ruminations, but they might subsequently be less likely to demonstrate increased cognitive rigidity and 
decreased problem-solving skills. 
Defusion is a psychological stepping back or distancing from thoughts and feelings (S. C. Hayes, 
Strosahl, et al., 1999). This is distinct from cognitive rigidity, which denotes a perseverative response to 
changing contingencies. That is, a cognitively inflexible person continues to respond in a way that was at 
one time - but is no longer - effective. Cognitive inflexibility may or may not be related to fusion with 
thoughts and feelings. The current study proposed that one aspect of the relationship between defusion and 
cognitive flexibility is that by achieving psychological distance from internal experiences (seeing 
thoughts/feelings as transient experiences rather than immutable truths) one may recognize alternate, and 
subsequently less perseverative, ways of responding. Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) found that 
ruminators were less cognitively flexible (i.e., performed more poorly on a test of cognitive flexibility, the 
WCST) than nonruminators. Perhaps one way in which this relationship could be attenuated is via 
increased cognitive defusion. 
1.5.6. Defusion: A Proposed Moderator between Rumination and Cognitive Flexibility 
It could logically follow that individuals who ruminate and who have the ability to gain distance 
from their thoughts will also experience their ruminative thoughts as less fused to their sense of self, and 
thus, be able to access alternate ways of being or acting (i.e., respond more flexibly).  Some studies 
examining rumination have investigated constructs similar to defusion and demonstrated associations 
between mindfulness and reductions in ruminative behavior.  For example, one study examined the effects 
of rumination, distraction, and mindfulness meditation on depressed mood (Broderick, 2005). Participants 
underwent a dysphoric mood induction and were then randomly assigned to one of the three conditions 
(rumination, distraction, mindfulness meditation). Following the mood induction, individuals in the 
mindfulness meditation condition were significantly less depressed (based on scores on the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule) than individuals in both the rumination and distraction condition. Though this 
study did not directly assess the concept of defusion, there are close similarities between the nonjudgmental 
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acceptance aspect of mindfulness and the psychological distancing component of defusion. Another study, 
extending research from the mindfulness literature, proposed that the harm of rumination was not based 
solely on attention to feelings of depression and unhappiness, but on the judgment-laden and self-critical 
aspect of rumination (Rude, Maestas, & Neff, 2007). Researchers examined Nolen-Hoeksema’s Response 
Styles Questionnaire (RSQ), which contains a “brooding” and “reflection” subscale. When these 
researchers re-worded the “reflection” portion of the RSQ so that it did not convey evaluative judgments 
(e.g., “Why am I reacting this way?” was reworded to “Feel curious about your tendency to be upset like 
this”), there was no longer a significant correlation between the reflection subscale of the RSQ and 
depression. Finally, in an experiment conducted by Watkins and Baracaia (2002), participants’ cognitive 
orientation to problem solving was manipulated. Among recovered-depressed individuals, a process-
focused orientation was associated with significantly better outcomes on a problem-solving task when 
compared to emotion-focused orientation. These researchers concluded that increasing an individual’s 
awareness of thoughts in the present moment might enable an individual to shift away from ruminative 
thinking and prevent depressive relapse. In sum, the aforementioned studies have found some evidence that 
mindfulness and nonjudgmental awareness have an attenuating effect on rumination.  
It could be that having greater present-moment awareness and nonjudgmental acceptance, and an 
ability to psychologically step back (i.e., be able to defuse) from one’s private experience could provide a 
buffer for individuals with tendencies toward rumination and allow them to respond more flexibly to their 
environment. According to ACT, defusion is associated with psychological flexibility, which though it may 
sound similar, should not be confused with cognitive flexibility or be associated with neuropsychological 
research involving executive functioning. Psychological flexibility refers to an individual’s ability to 
“contact the present moment more fully as a conscious human being, and to change or persist in behavior 
when doing so serves valued ends” (S. C. Hayes, et al., 2006). Thus the individual’s behavior is guided by 
his/her values rather than the attempt to avoid suffering. If an individual is able to see his/her thoughts as 
mere mental activity rather than as necessarily reflecting reality (i.e., defuse from these thoughts), he or she 
may become aware of alternative ways of responding to the environment, and essentially, be able to choose 
a behavior that maximizes the possibility for an adaptive outcome. Essentially, it may be that defusing 
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reduces the effect of rumination on cognitive flexibility (i.e., the ability to inhibit a dominant response and 
consider other, more adaptive alternatives). 
Consider the depressed student whose dominant response may be to ruminate about perceived 
failures instead of studying: No matter how hard I study, I will fail. The contingency in place is “It doesn’t 
matter if I do study or don’t study; the end result is failure.” This mental set makes it difficult for her to 
generate alternative appraisals (e.g., Here is an example of a time I didn’t fail) that might provide an 
impetus for solution-oriented action (i.e., studying). However, her ability to defuse from her ruminations 
about her perceived academic failures might enable her to distance herself from the dominant response 
(ruminating), making space for her to generate alternative appraisals for her situation (i.e., not seeing the 
upcoming exam as inevitable failure), and thus choose from a variety of possible behaviors, including more 
adaptive ones (i.e., going to the library to study) thus exhibiting solution orientated behavior that resolves 
her problem. The current study hypothesized that defusion would attenuate the effect of rumination on 
cognitive flexibility. 
1.6. Hypotheses 
1. Rumination would be associated with poor problem-solving performance.  Based on the 
existing literature, this preliminary hypothesis posited that there would be a negative 
relationship between rumination and problem solving. As discussed in the preceding 
sections, there is a significant amount of evidence supporting an association between 
rumination and problem-solving deficits, and it was proposed that this finding would be 
replicated in the current study. It was hypothesized that this relationship would exist, 
even while controlling for depression. 
a. State-rumination would be more strongly, positively associated with problem-solving 
deficits among individuals with depressive symptoms.  Rumination as a construct is a 
stable, trait-like characteristic, which has been shown to interfere with problem 
solving ability. However, several experimental studies have demonstrated that high 
levels of state rumination (i.e., rumination inductions) are associated with problem 
solving deficits particularly among those with depressive or dysphoric symptoms, 
relative to those with fewer depressive symptoms. 
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2. Rumination would be associated with reduced cognitive flexibility.  Previous studies have 
demonstrated a negative association between rumination and cognitive flexibility. 
Individuals who have ruminative tendencies tend to dwell on their mental and emotional 
state, thinking repetitively and persistently about this content. This mental activity tends 
to be limited in focus and the ruminator may find it difficult to “just think about 
something else” (i.e., stop ruminating and adaptively respond when the rules change) 
because of his/her perseverative style. Thus, a second preliminary hypothesis of the 
current study was that rumination would be negatively associated with cognitive 
flexibility. It was hypothesized that this relationship would exist even when controlling 
for depression. 
3. Cognitive flexibility would be associated with enhanced problem-solving.  Cognitive 
flexibility is one aspect of executive function and is an important part of one’s ability to 
problem-solve. The role of cognitive flexibility is especially important in novel 
situations. Based on the aforementioned discussion, a third preliminary hypothesis of the 
current study was that decreased cognitive flexibility would be associated with deficits in 
problem solving. It was hypothesized that this relationship would be maintained even 
while controlling for depression (see Raes, et al., 2005), and nonperseverative errors. 
4. Cognitive flexibility would mediate the relationship between rumination and problem 
solving.  In social and psychological research, mediation refers to a model in which a 
third variable represents the theorized mechanism through which an independent variable 
influences a dependent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon, Lockwood, 
Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In the current study, it was 
proposed that cognitive flexibility is a variable through which rumination influences 
problem-solving ability (see Figure 1). Previous research indicates that ruminators 
demonstrate problem-solving deficits (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) and increased cognitive rigidity (Davis & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Because of the known importance of cognitive flexibility in 
determining the effectiveness with which one solves a problem, it was proposed that it is 
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due (at least in part) to the presence of cognitive rigidity that ruminators demonstrate 
deficits on a problem-solving task.  
5. Defusion would moderate the relationship between rumination and cognitive flexibility.  
It was hypothesized that the relationship between rumination and cognitive flexibility 
would be attenuated by defusion (see Figure 2). For a model of the proposed interaction 
see Figure 3.As discussed above, individuals who have a tendency to ruminate have think 
about their symptoms in an unrelenting manner and this is associated with a more 
difficulty switching attention (i.e., set-shifting) to respond more effectively based on 
environmental demands. Thus, it was thought that if high ruminators are also highly 
fused to their thoughts and feelings they would demonstrate the lowest levels of cognitive 
flexibility. However, individuals who ruminate – but at the same time are able to achieve 
psychological distance from these thoughts – would demonstrate a degree of cognitive 
flexibility that resembles non-ruminators.  
CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
2.1. Participants 
Participants were a nonclinical sample of undergraduate students attending Drexel University and 
represented a heterogeneous group of college-aged individuals (18-65) from a variety of diverse 
backgrounds. Recruitment of participants commenced after the Drexel University Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) approved the current study’s proposed plan of study and methodology. Recruitment entailed 
campus flyers, website advertisements through Drexel list serves, and announcements made in psychology 
courses. Students were offered extra credit for participation in the study, and consequently, were only 
eligible if they were currently enrolled in a psychology course. (Professors did offer students other 
opportunities to earn extra credit so no students were made to feel obligated to participate in the research 
study.) Time taken to complete the study was typically between 60 and 90 minutes.  
2.2. Measures 
The measures, described in the following paragraphs, were administered (see Appendix B). 
Rumination 
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Ruminative Responses Scale.  The Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS), a measure of rumination, 
is a 22-item survey that assesses how individuals respond to their negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991). The RRS contains items that assess self-focused responses to depression (e.g., “Why do I 
react this way?”), symptom focused responses (e.g., “I think about how hard it is to concentrate.”), and 
possible consequences or implications of such responses (e.g., “I think I won’t be able to do my job if I 
don’t snap out of this.”). Participants respond to these items on a 4-point Likert scale, in which 1 = almost 
never and 4 = almost always. The RRS has demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 
.90; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). The RRS has also demonstrated good predictive validity in 
regards to depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and adequate test-retest reliability (Calmes & 
Roberts, 2007).  
For the purposes of assessing present-moment levels of rumination (the RRS measures trait 
rumination), we created a state version of the RRS. Reliability analyses indicated very high internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .95). The state version was significantly and positively correlated with the 
trait version (r = .70, p < .01). Both the state (r = .65, p < .01) and trait (r = .60, p < .01) version of the RRS 
were also significantly, positively correlated with depression (i.e., score on the BDI-II) suggesting good 
concurrent validity. For reader clarification, RRS-T will refer to the original measure and RRS-S will refer 
to the state version. Scores on the Ruminative Responses Scale (both trait and state versions) can range 
from 22 – 88, with higher scores indicating more intense rumination.  
A more recent examination of the RRS found support for a two-factor model of rumination, 
termed reflection and brooding (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). According to these 
researchers, reflection refers to a propensity to turn inward as an attempt to problem solve. Brooding is a 
term used to describe a “passive comparison of one’s current situation with some unachieved standard” 
(Treynor, et al., 2003, p. 256). Brooding is speculated to be the more detrimental aspect of rumination. Five 
of the 22 items on the RRS directly assess brooding and these items (5, 10, 13, 15, 16) can be summed to 
compute a brooding sub-score that can range from 5 to 20. The current study’s assessments permitted 
measurement of both trait- and state- brooding. 
Problem Solving 
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 The Means-End Problem Solving Task.  The Means-Ends Problem-Solving (MEPS) procedure 
(Platt & Spivack, 1975) measures an individual’s ability to conceptualize a step-by-step method that arrives 
at a solution to a problem. Individuals are presented with the beginning and end of an interpersonal 
problem situation and asked to describe what would be done to bring about the ending. The goal is to 
imagine oneself actually experiencing the event, as opposed to bringing about creative solutions 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). However, researchers have also recommended that participants 
be told to think about the most ideal strategy (not what they would actually do) in order to lessen the 
impact of motivational factors (Butler & Meichenbaum, 1981; Marx, et al., 1992). The original version of 
the MEPS was designed for use with a clinical sample and includes 10 interpersonal problems, but 
researchers have criticized some of the vignettes for portraying unrealistic situations or failing to invoke 
social problem-solving tactics (Nezu & Ronan, 1988).  Thus, to resonate more fully with a student sample, 
the current study utilized four of the original 10 based on others’ recommendations (Marx, et al., 1992): (1) 
you realize a friend is avoiding you; (2) your partner leaves you after an argument, (3) you are having 
trouble getting along with the boss at work, and (4) you have moved to a new area and do not know 
anyone. Further, the validity of assessing problem solving using these four situations has been supported by 
findings from other studies (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). The 
MEPS is typically scored by assessing the number of relevant means that are offered by the participant 
(Marx, et al., 1992). Relevant means are the steps that are involved in solving the problem. The MEPS can 
also be scored qualitatively, with raters scoring the overall effectiveness (see D'Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971) 
of the participants’ proposed strategies (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Marx, et al., 1992). The 
MEPS has demonstrated satisfactory internal reliability (from .80 to .84) (Marx, et al., 1992). The MEPS 
has been shown to measure a valid construct in studies examining groups that differ in their level of 
behavioral and emotional adjustment (Platt & Spivack, 1972; Platt, Spivack, Altman, Altman, & Peizer, 
1974). Furthermore researchers have demonstrated that score on the MEPS (i.e., social problem-solving 
ability) does not correlate with measures of intellectual abilities (Gotlib & Asarnow, 1979; Platt & Spivack, 
1975; Siegel, Platt, & Peizer, 1976). 
The vignettes were presented in a random order and participants’ responses to the vignettes were 
audio recorded. Participants were instructed to connect the beginning and end of the story, by providing the 
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ideal strategies and steps necessary to solve the problem. They were instructed to do so in as much detail as 
possible. The current study measured both the number of relevant means (i.e., number of discrete steps that 
enable the protagonist of the story to reach stated goal and/or to overcome an obstacle that prevented the 
protagonist from reaching the goal) and overall effectiveness, using two blind raters (i.e., two trained study 
personnel who had not administered the MEPS to the participant), based on the guidelines provided by 
D’Zurrilla and Goldfried (1971). The number of means and the effectiveness ratings were averaged across 
all four stories for each participant. Consistency between the raters was found to be very good for both the 
number of means and the effectiveness ratings with intraclass correlation coefficients ranging from .85 to 
.92 on ratings of number of means and .78 to .86 on effectiveness ratings.  This level of consistency is 
similar to what others have reported when using the MEPS (Marx, et al., 1992). 
 Anagram Test.  Anagram tests are common in research studies examining impersonal problem-
solving ability (Gotlib & Asarnow, 1979; Oster & Pope, 1982; Silver, et al., 2004). One commonly used 
anagram test – employed by Hiroto and Seligman (1975) in studies of learned helplessness, and Gotlib and 
Asarnow (1979) in studies of depression – involves presenting participants with a series of scrambled, five 
letter words taken from a list of anagrams provided by Tresselt and Mayzner (1966). Anagrams can be 
arranged based on a pre-arranged format or, in the sequence 3-4-2-5-1 (e.g., the anagram N-D-A-Y-C is 
solved CANDY). Participants can then be scored on mean response latency (i.e., time taken to solve the 
anagram), number of unsolved anagrams, and number of trials taken to learn the pattern (if using the 3-4-2-
5-1 sequence). Individuals were presented the anagrams in the prearranged format and were scored on two 
dimensions: (1) their response type, i.e., whether they provided a correct answer, passed or did not know 
the answer, provided an incorrect guess, or persisted to the time limit (5 minutes) and (2) the amount of 
time, in seconds, it took to provide one of these responses.  
Cognitive Flexibility 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Cognitive flexibility, as measured by the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (WCST; D. A. Grant & Berg, 1948; Milner, 1963) refers to an individual’s ability to switch 
his/her attention from one aspect of an object to another (Stemme, Deco, & Busch, 2007; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). Cognitive flexibility refers to one’s ability to change his/her attentional set in the presence 
of changing external contingencies. The participant’s objective on the WCST is to sort a set of response 
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cards on the basis of three different characteristics: color, shape, and number. Though the participant did 
not receive explicit rules regarding the method of sorting, he/she received feedback as to whether his/her 
response was correct. After the participant achieved a certain number of successful sorts, the sorting 
criterion changed without the individual’s awareness. The participant then received a number of different 
scores in various dimensions. One of the most commonly reported scores is number of perseverative errors 
(e.g., when the participant sorts according to a criterion that is no longer in effect, with higher numbers 
indicating decreased cognitive flexibility)1
Defusion 
. Another common variable assessed in the WCST includes the 
number of non-perseverative errors (i.e., the number of times one sorted according to a new rule) with 
higher numbers indicating decreased task performance, but not necessarily cognitive inflexibility. The 
WCST is considered to be a measure of executive function (Channon, 1996; Greve, Stickle, Love, 
Bianchini, & Stanford, 2005; Rhodes, 2004) and has also been specifically used to assess individuals’ 
cognitive flexibility (Calmes & Roberts, 2007; Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Deveney & Deldin, 2006; 
Stemme, et al., 2007). Further, the WCST is reported to be one of the most commonly used measures of 
executive function, specifically in terms of cognitive flexibility (Bustini, et al., 1999; Damasio & Anderson, 
2003). The current study measured the number of perseverative errors, as this has been suggested to be the 
purest measure of cognitive inflexibility, and number of non-perseverative errors because researchers using 
this measure have argued that it is important to distinguish between impaired performance due to an 
inflexible style and poor performance due to general cognitive impairment (Deveney & Deldin, 2006). 
The Drexel Defusion Scale.The Drexel Defusion Scale (DDS; Forman, Herbert, & Moitra, 2008, 
November) is a self-report questionnaire assessing the extent to which a person is able to distance 
him/herself from negative thoughts, feelings, and physiological reactions. The measure begins with a 3-
paragraph definition of defusion, and is followed by ten items presenting common scenarios that elicit 
negative internal responses and participants are asked to rate their ability to distance themselves (i.e., 
defuse) from these experiences on a 6-point Likert scale, in which 0 = Not at all and 5 = Very much. 
Defusion is explicitly assessed in each of the following domains: feelings of anger, cravings for food, 
                                                 
1 Heaton, R. K., Chelune, G. J., Talley, J. L., Kay, G., & Curtiss, G. (1993). Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
manual: Revised and expanded. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. 
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physical pain, anxious thoughts, thoughts of self, thoughts of hopelessness, thoughts about motivation or 
ability, thoughts about one’s future, sensations of fear, and feelings of sadness. The following is a sample 
question from the DDS: 
Anxious Thoughts.  Things have not been going well at school or at your job, and work 
just keeps piling up.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from anxious 
thoughts like “I’ll never get this done”? 
Scores on the DDS can range from 0 to 50, with higher scores reflecting greater psychological distance 
from psychologically distressing experiences. The DDS was developed by Forman and colleagues, and was 
recently piloted on a clinical sample in the Drexel University Graduate Student Counseling Center. The 
current study added 5 items to capture rumination situations (DDS-Rumination Subscale, DDS-RS), for the 
purpose of directly assessing how well individuals can defuse from ruminations. For example: 
Thoughts about your reaction.  Imagine that your mood begins to worsen. As a result 
your sleep and eating habits change, you notice changes in your energy level, and you 
start to feel bad about yourself. You notice yourself thinking: “Why do I always react this 
way?” To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from a thought like this? 
Scores on the DDS-RS can theoretically range from 0-25 and scores on the DDS-Combined Version (DDS-
C) can range from 0-75.  
Reliability analyses indicated good internal consistency among the five rumination items 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .82) and the full, 15-item scale (DDS-C), which included the five rumination items 
and the ten, original DDS items (Cronbach’s alpha = .83). All inter-item correlations among the rumination 
items were significant ranging from r = .27 - .67, and all DDS-RS items significantly and positively 
correlated with the summed DDS-Rumination Subscale (r = .65 - .83) and summed original DDS (r = .41 - 
.56) score. Analyses also revealed that the summed DDS-RS (5 items) and summed original DDS (10 
items) were positively, and significantly correlated (r = .68, p < .01).   
 The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale.  The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto, Herbert, 
Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008) is a twenty-item self-report measure designed to assess mindfulness, 
defined by two primary components: present-moment awareness and nonjudgmental acceptance. 
Individuals rate items on a 5-point Likert scale, in which 0 = never and 4 =very often. Ten items assess 
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level of awareness (e.g., “I aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind”) and ten reverse-score 
items assess level of acceptance (e.g., “I try to distract myself when I feel unpleasant emotions”). 
Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses have supported the two-factor structure. Good internal 
consistency has been demonstrated in both clinical and non-clinical samples. Correlation analyses have 
found that the awareness and acceptance subscales are not correlated with each other, thus providing 
additional support for the bi-dimensional conceptualization of mindfulness.  
Based on the current study’s research question, only the acceptance subscale of the PHLMS was 
examined. The acceptance subscale assesses one’s ability to nonjudgmentally have a negative emotion or 
thought as opposed to distracting oneself or forcing oneself to not think or feel a certain way. Individuals 
who score high on the acceptance subscale, are more likely to cope with negative states by distancing 
themselves in an nonjudgmental manner (i.e., stepping back from psychological experiences), which 
contrasts sharply with one who attempts to directly control his/her internal experience and one who is very 
fused to negative thoughts and feelings, thus making it an important measure to have included in the current 
study as an additional measure of defusion. The 10 items of the acceptance subscale are reverse-scored, 
with higher scores indicating greater acceptance. Total scores are capable of ranging from 10 to 50. 
Experiences Questionnaire.  The Experiences Questionnaire (EQ; Fresco, et al., 2007) is a twenty-
item self-report measure of decentering, or the ability to view thoughts and feelings as transient experiences 
of the mind rather than accurate self-reflections (Safran & Segal, 1990). The EQ was used to further assess 
individuals' level of defusion (i.e., psychological distancing). Items (e.g., I remind myself that thoughts 
aren’t facts; I can observe unpleasant feelings without being drawn into them) are rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale, in which 1 = never and 5 = All the time.  Although the EQ contains questions that assess both 
rumination and decentering, the EQ was used solely for the purpose of assessing decentering, because 
evidence supports a one-dimensional factor structure (decentering) of the measure. Decentering is assessed 
by 11 of the 20 items2
Other Measures 
. Thus total scores can range from 11 to 55.The EQ has demonstrated good internal 
consistency among both recovering depressed (a = .90) and student (a = .83) samples. Additionally, the EQ 
has demonstrated good concurrent and discriminant validity.  
                                                 
2 Item numbers on the EQ assessing decentering: 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 
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Beck Depression Inventory – 2nd Edition.  The Beck Depression Inventory – 2nd Edition (BDI-II; 
Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996), an extensively used and studied assessment tool, was designed to 
assess the severity of current depressive symptoms. The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report measure. Items are 
rated on an ordinal scale from 0 to 3, with lower scores indicating fewer symptoms of depression. Scores 
are summed and can be used to classify individuals on the basis of depression severity. The BDI-II has 
been shown to have good reliability and strong content, concurrent, and discriminant validity in both 
clinical and nonclinical samples (Beck, Steer, & Carbin, 1988). 
2.3. Procedure 
Approval from Drexel University’s Institutional Review Board was obtained and informed 
consent was obtained from all of the participants. Self-report data were collected electronically. A 
demographic questionnaire was completed prior to the collection of primary variables. In accordance with 
Baron and Kenny’s moderation suggestions (1986) the moderator variables (i.e., DDS, PHLMS, EQ) were 
measured first. Participants then completed the BDI-II, and the RRS. Participants were then administered a 
computerized version of the WCST. Finally, participants completed the MEPS procedure and the anagram 
task.  
Following the participant’s completion of the survey and testing procedures, participants were 
debriefed. Each participant was given a copy of the consent form and extra credit was awarded through the 
online extra-credit remuneration program, Sona Systems.  
2.4. Statistical Analysis 
 Descriptive data (e.g., range) were examined mid-way through the data collection process to 
ensure adequate variability. Sufficient variability existed and thus it was not necessary to recruit 
participants outside of the student population. Following the data collection phase, data were examined to 
determine if the distribution patterns were abnormal. Data were transformed in in the instance that shape 
was abnormal. Each hypothesis was tested based on the analyses described in the following section. 
1. Hypothesis 1: To measure if rumination was negatively related to problem solving, a 
zero-order correlation was used to examine the relationship between score on the MEPS 
(i.e., both number of relevant means and overall effectiveness) and score on the RRS and 
score on the Anagram test and score on the RRS. Additionally, a multiple regression 
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analysis was used to determine if this relationship remained while controlling for score 
on the BDI-II. 
1a. Hypothesis 1a: To measure if state rumination was more negatively related to problem 
solving among those with depressive symptoms (relative to those with fewer depressive 
symptoms) a multiple regression was conducted with problem solving (score on the 
Anagram test and score on the MEPS) regressed on state rumination (centered), 
depression (centered) and the interaction term 
2. Hypothesis 2: To measure if rumination was negatively related to cognitive flexibility, a 
zero-order correlation was used to examine the relationship between number of 
perseverative errors on the WCST and score on the RRS. Additionally, a multiple 
regression was used to determine if this relationship was maintained while controlling for 
score on the BDI-II and non-perseverative errors on the WCST. 
3. Hypothesis 3: To measure if cognitive flexibility was positively related to problem 
solving, a zero-order correlation was used to examine if score on the MEPS (i.e., both 
number of relevant means and overall effectiveness) was correlated with the number of 
perseverative errors on the WCST. Additionally, a zero-order correlation was used to 
examine if there was a significant relationship between score on the Anagram task (i.e., 
number of correctly solved anagrams and average time taken to solve correctly) and the 
number of perseverative errors on the WCST. A multiple regression was used to 
determine if the relationship between cognitive flexibility and problem solving was 
maintained while controlling for score on the BDI-II and the number of non-perseverative 
errors on the WCST.  
Effect sizes were reported in cases where results failed to find support for these preliminary 
hypotheses. Additionally, descriptive statistics were examined (e.g., range, standard deviation) to 
form conclusions about variability.  
4. Hypothesis 4: Mediation can be tested through a variety of statistical methods. One 
method, bootstrapping, is a resampling method that deals with the common problem of 
the lack of normality of indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 
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2002). Resampling refers to a complex statistical procedure wherein a sample size of n 
cases is taken, with replacement, from the original sample and all paths are re-estimated 
and the indirect effect is re-calculated. This process is repeated k times with k being 
preferably at least 1,000. Thus, the statistical method yields k estimates of the total (c 
path) and indirect effects (ab paths) of the independent variable (rumination) on the 
dependent variable (problem solving). This creates new distributions, which serve as 
empirical, nonparametric approximations of the sampling distributions of the indirect 
effect (i.e., the effect of rumination on problem-solving through cognitive flexibility). 
Bootstrap confidence intervals are created by ordering the k values of the indirect effect 
(i.e., ab paths) from low to high. Researchers have argued that bias corrected bootstrap 
confidence intervals should be used because they provide more accurate estimates of the 
confidence interval and thus better prevent errors in hypothesis testing (Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1993; Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Bootstrapping with 
bias corrected confidence intervals is superior to other tests of mediation like causal steps 
approaches (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986) and product-of-coefficients approaches (see 
MacKinnon, et al., 2002 for a review) in terms of power and Type I error rates, especially 
in smaller samples with smaller effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 
2002). Noteworthy, is that this method does not require that the a path (i.e., the 
relationship between rumination and cognitive flexibility) or the b path (i.e., the 
relationship between cognitive flexibility and problem solving) be significant. To 
measure if cognitive flexibility mediates the relationship between rumination and 
problem solving, the current study used a bootstrapping method (k = 5,000) with bias 
corrected confidence intervals based on the macros created by Preacher and Hayes 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In regard to the macros, both normal theory tests and 
bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effect of rumination on problem solving through 
cognitive flexibility (ab path) were examined based on the difference between the total 
and direct effect (i.e., c – c’ = ab). Specifically, the significance of the indirect effect was 
examined based on the critical ratio (i.e., the indirect effect divided by the standard error), 
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which yields a Z value (and a corresponding p value) on the macro output (normal theory 
test). Additionally, significance the indirect effect was examined via the bootstrapped 
estimate along with bias corrected confidence intervals. It should be noted that although 
mediation is a causal model, the current study's research design (i.e., the cross-sectional 
nature of the data) does will not permit one to draw causal conclusions. Future, 
longitudinal-based studies collecting data at multiple time points and analyzing these data 
with sophisticated statistical methods (e.g., hierarchical linear modeling) would be more 
suited to drawing conclusions regarding the temporal relationship between these 
constructs.  
Hypothesis 5: To measure the moderating effect of defusion on the relationship between 
rumination and cognitive flexibility, a multiple regression was conducted to examine the 
interaction between rumination and defusion on cognitive flexibility (Aiken & West, 
1991). Procedurally, the two independent variables (rumination and defusion) were 
mean-centered based on the suggestion of some researchers (Aiken & West, 1991; 
Cronbach, 1987; Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). This process involves subtracting the 
overall mean of the variable from each individual score. The process creates a new mean 
of zero while maintaining the variability. Although some have suggested that centering 
variables is unnecessary (Kromrey & Foster-Johnson, 1998), others have suggested that 
this step is important in preventing multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
The newly created, centered variables were multiplied to create the interaction term. The 
three variables (rumination-centered, defusion-centered, interaction term) were entered 
into a multiple regression, with cognitive flexibility regressed on these three terms. 
2.5. Power Analysis 
Statistically, tests of interaction typically have less power than tests of main effects (Aiken & 
West, 1991). In order to be conservative when estimating sample size, a power analysis was conducted for 
the effect that, ahead of time, was speculated to be smallest (i.e., the rumination x defusion interaction 
effect). Based on a previous examination (a 3 x 3 ANOVA examining interaction effects) of the 
relationships between similar variables of interest (e.g., rumination, problem solving) the present study 
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expected a small to medium effect size (i.e., ƒ2 between .05 and .14) for the moderation analysis (Watkins 
& Baracaia, 2002). Thus, with an α = .05 and ƒ2 = .09, a sample size of 90 was considered to achieve 
adequate (.80) power for the proposed moderation analysis (the R2 increase for the interaction effect in a 
multiple regression with two independent variables), as computed by G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007).  
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
3.1. Sample Characteristics 
The final sample consisted of 97 undergraduate students ranging in age from 17 to 33 years old (M 
= 20.4). A majority were female (59.8%), Caucasian (50.5%), single (93.8%), and enrolled full-time 
(94.8%). Notably, a substantial portion of the sample consisted of foreign nationals (26.8%) and non-native 
English speakers (25.8%) (see Table 1). The mean level of depressive symptoms assessed by the BDI-II 
was minimal (M = 10.60; SD = 8.67). 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for all study variables are presented in Table 2. With the exception of 
perseverative and nonperseverative errors on the WCST, all variables were normally distributed and had 
normal shape. The distribution of both perseverative errors and nonperseverative errors was significantly, 
positively skewed, indicating that most individuals had few errors on the WCST. This finding is not 
surprising because the sample consisted of a nonclinical group of students without significant cognitive 
impairments. However, to prevent threats to the proposed statistical analyses, both variables were 
transformed using a log transformation. 
3.3. Rumination and Problem Solving (Hypothesis 1) 
To test the hypothesis that rumination would be associated with poor problem-solving 
performance, a series of zero-order correlations were performed. As seen in Table 3, associations between 
both state and trait rumination and problem solving were very weak and not statistically significant (r = -
.15 - .02). To be complete, multiple regressions were conducted so that the relationship between rumination 
and problem-solving could be examined, while controlling for depression.  As one might expect, based on 
the results of the zero-order correlations, the association remained close to zero and corresponding effect 
sizes were generally small (average r = .09) (see Table 3b). Correlation analyses did not reveal a significant 
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relationship between brooding and social problem solving (see Table 3). However, in terms of impersonal 
problem solving, the relationships were somewhat stronger between trait- (r = -.19, p = .06) and state- (r = 
-.20, p = .05) brooding and total number of correctly solved anagrams, suggesting that brooding is 
associated with poorer outcomes (i.e., fewer number of solved anagrams) on an impersonal problem 
solving task (see Table 3). To determine if brooding predicted problem solving deficits, while controlling 
for depression, multiple regressions were conducted. Both state (b = -.30, SE = .14, t = -2.06, p < .05) and 
trait (b = -.30, SE = .15, t = -1.99, p < .05) brooding predicted the number of correctly solved anagrams, 
while holding the effects of depression constant. The size of these effects was moderate (β = -0.25, -0.24)  
(see Table 3b). In terms of the relationship between brooding and the time it took to correctly solve each 
anagram, no relationship emerged (r = -.10, -.09). 
 There was little support for the hypothesis that rumination, as a broad construct, was associated 
with problem solving (there was some support for a relationship between brooding and problem solving 
deficits). However, the effect of rumination on problem solving was impacted by depression (b = .009, SE 
= .004, t = 2.119, p < .05), such that at lower levels of depression, rumination was negatively associated 
with the number of correctly solved anagrams and at higher levels of depression, rumination was slightly, 
positively associated with the number of correctly solved anagrams (F= 2.17, R2 = .07, p = .10), though the 
size of the effect was small (β = .01) (see Figure 4).  
3.3.1. Hypothesis 1a 
To test the hypothesis that state-rumination would be more strongly, positively associated with 
problem-solving deficits among individuals with more depressive symptoms (compared to those with less 
depression), a multiple regression was computed in which problem solving was regressed on state 
rumination, depression, and the interaction term (state rumination × depression). A statistically significant 
interaction emerged, but not in the hypothesized direction (b = .010, SE = .003, t = 2.994, p < .01). 
Specifically, among those with low or average levels of depression, state rumination was negatively 
associated with the number of correctly solved anagrams. However, among those with high depression (i.e., 
1 SD above the sample mean) there was virtually no relationship between state rumination and performance 
on the anagram task; and, among those with very high levels of depression (i.e., 2 SD above the sample 
mean), state rumination was positively associated with performance on the anagram task (see Figure 5).  
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The model accounted for a significant portion of variance (F = 3.83, R2 = .11, p < .05), though the size of 
the effect was small (β = .01). 
3.4. Rumination and Cognitive Flexibility (Hypothesis 2)  
To test the hypothesis that rumination would be associated with cognitive flexibility a series of 
zero-order correlations were computed. As seen in Table 4, cognitive flexibility was virtually unassociated 
with rumination variables (r = -0.04 – +0.04), including when simultaneously controlling for depression 
and nonperseverative errors (average β = -.07) (Table 4b).  
3.5. Cognitive Flexibility and Problem Solving (Hypothesis 3) 
To test the hypothesis that cognitive flexibility would be associated with better problem solving, a 
series a correlation analyses were computed. Correlation analyses revealed that cognitive flexibility was not 
associated with social problem solving (r’s = .07) (see Table 5). Not surprisingly, this relationship 
remained close to zero when simultaneously controlling for depression and nonperseverative errors and the 
effect sizes were small (β’s = .13) (see Table 5b). 
In terms of impersonal problem solving, the number of perseverative errors on the WCST was 
significantly, negatively correlated with the mean time it took for an individual to correctly solve an 
anagram (r = -.32, p < .01). These results, suggesting that cognitive inflexibility is associated with quicker 
time to correctly solve an anagram task, were in the direction opposite what would have been predicted (see 
Table 5). This relationship remained significant, even when holding the effects of depression and 
nonperseverative errors constant (b = -32.48, SE = 15.58, t = -2.09, p < .05) (see Table 5b), with the model 
accounting for a significant portion of variance (F = 4.54, p < .01, R2= .13). The size of the effect was 
moderate (β = -.31). There was no relationship between the number of perseverative errors on the WCST 
and the number of correctly solved anagrams (r = -.17) (see Table 5), including when controlling for 
depression and nonperseverative errors (β = -.12) (see Table 5b). 
3.6. Mediation Results (Hypothesis 4) 
Traditional models (i.e., the causal steps method proposed by Baron & Kenny, 1986) of mediation 
require paths a, b, and c to be significant for mediational analyses to continue. To test the hypothesis that 
cognitive inflexibility mediates the relationship between rumination and problem solving deficits, 
bootstrapping analyses, with bias corrected confidence intervals, were conducted based on the 
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recommendation of Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008). As discussed above, one advantage more 
sophisticated approaches to mediation (e.g., bootstrapping) is that formal mediation is not contingent on the 
statistical significance of the a, b, and c paths (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  Rather, the emphasis is on the 
direction and size of the indirect effect, i.e., the difference between the total and direct effect (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). Additionally, bootstrapping methods are advantageous because they do not assume that the 
variables or the sampling distribution (of the indirect effect) are normal (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  
In the current study’s test of mediation, both (1) normal theory tests and (2) bootstrapped 
estimates were computed using the Preacher and Hayes macro (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) to calculate (1) 
the asymptotic critical ratio (i.e., Z value), which is based on the Sobel test, and (2) the bootstrapped 
estimate of the indirect effect (along with bias corrected confidence intervals), respectively. 
The current study examined the indirect effects of rumination on four dependent variables 
(number of strategies provided on the MEPS, average effectiveness on the MEPS, number of correct 
anagrams, mean time taken to correctly solve an anagram) through one possible mediator, cognitive 
inflexibility (i.e., number of perseverative errors on the WCST). To do this, we bootstrapped the indirect 
effects of rumination on problem solving; the bootstrap estimates are based on 5,000 bootstrap samples. 
The small indirect effect of trait rumination (through cognitive inflexibility) on the average number of 
means on the MEPS (Z = -.50; p = .65), the average effectiveness of the strategies provided on the MEPS 
(Z = -.45; p = .65), the number of correctly solved anagrams (Z = .35; p = .73), and the mean time taken to 
correctly solve an anagram (Z = .35; p = .73) suggested that mediation did not occur. However, it is 
important to note that the estimate of the critical ratio (i.e., Z) is based on the assumption that the 
distribution of the indirect effect (i.e., ab) is normal (Preacher & Hayes, 2004)3
 To prevent committing a Type I error, the indirect effects of state-rumination and brooding were 
bootstrapped on problem solving. Normal theory tests of mediation revealed a small, indirect effect in all 
. Thus, the bootstrapping 
approach – which makes no assumptions about normality or the shape of the distribution – was used to 
verify these results. Consistent with the normal theory tests (i.e., Z values) the bootstrap results for the total 
indirect effect of trait rumination on these problem solving variables through cognitive inflexibility 
indicated a very small indirect effect (see Table 6). 
                                                 
3 As discussed in preceding sections, this assumption is risky, because oftentimes the distribution of ab is 
neither normal nor symmetrical.  
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cases, suggesting that mediation did not occur. These findings were corroborated by the bootstrap results 
(see Table7). 
3.7. Moderation Results (Hypothesis 5) 
To determine if defusion moderated the relationship between rumination and cognitive 
inflexibility, a multiple regression was conducted, with the number of perseverative errors regressed on 
rumination, defusion, and the interaction term (rumination × defusion). For the purpose of the analysis, 
defusion was defined as the combination of the 10 original defusion items and the 5 rumination-related 
items. Results of the regression analyses suggested that defusion does not moderate the relationship 
between rumination and cognitive inflexibility (see Table 8). Further, the size of the effect was small (β = 
.02).  Similar results emerged when simultaneously controlling for the effects of depression and 
nonperseverative errors.  
In addition to analyzing the moderating effect of defusion, the current study also examined if 
decentering (i.e., score on the EQ) moderated the relationship between rumination and cognitive 
inflexibility. A series of multiple regressions suggested that decentering did not moderate the relationship 
between rumination and cognitive inflexibility (see Table 8). Moreover, the size of the effect was small (β 
= .05). Results were similar when controlling for depression and nonperseverative WCST errors (β = -.01, -
.03, respectively).  
3.8. Post-Hoc Analyses 
 It was thought that the deleterious effects of rumination on depression might be attenuated by 
one’s ability to achieve psychological distance from mental events. Thus, to determine if defusion and 
decentering moderated this relationship, a series of multiple regressions were conducted.  Depression was 
regressed on rumination, defusion, and the interaction term (rumination × defusion). A significant 
interaction emerged between defusion and trait rumination (b = -.009, SE = .004, t = -2.145, p < .05), with 
a significant amount of variance accounted for (F = 20.849, R2 = .402, p < .001), though the size of the 
interaction effect was small (β = -.01). This interaction suggests that rumination is positively associated 
with depression, but this relationship is weaker among individuals who are “high defusers,” i.e., those who 
can achieve greater psychological distance from distressing internal experiences (see Figure 6). Similarly, 
decentering, a construct similar to defusion, significantly moderated the relationship between trait 
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rumination and depression (b = -.026, SE = .008, t = -3.182, p < .01), with the model accounting for a 
significant portion of the variance (F = 25.957, R2 = .456, p < .001), suggesting that the positive 
relationship between rumination and depression is weaker among those endorsing a more decentered 
perspective (see Figure 7). Of note, the size of this interaction effect was small (β = -.03). Interestingly, 
psychological acceptance did not moderate the relationship between rumination and depression (b = -.004, 
SE = .007, t = -.671, p = .504). 
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
4.1. Preliminary Results 
 The current study sought to determine whether rumination interferes with problem solving ability 
(i.e., via cognitive inflexibility) and how psychological distancing strategies might buffer ruminators’ 
tendencies toward cognitive inflexibility. Thus, we examined (a) the relationships between rumination, 
cognitive flexibility, and problem solving; (b) whether cognitive inflexibility mediated the relationship 
between rumination and problem solving; and (c) whether defusion moderated the relationship between 
rumination and cognitive flexibility. By means of post-hoc analyses, the study also examined if 
psychological distancing and mindfulness attenuated the relationship between rumination and depression. 
As such, this was the first study to examine rumination, cognitive flexibility, and problem solving in the 
context of a single model. Moreover, this was one of the first studies to examine the protective role of 
various psychological distancing strategies in rumination and its impact on cognitive flexibility and 
depression. 
Support for the preliminary hypotheses examining the relationships among rumination, problem 
solving, and cognitive flexibility was weak. Contrary to what has been demonstrated in other studies, there 
was virtually no relationship between rumination and interpersonal problem solving, rumination and 
cognitive flexibility, and cognitive flexibility and interpersonal problem solving. Perhaps the measure of 
social problem solving (i.e., the MEPS) was not sensitive enough to detect problem solving deficits among 
a nonclinical, generally high functioning sample. Although researchers claim that the MEPS measures a 
valid construct regardless of individuals’ behavioral and emotional adjustment (Platt & Spivack, 1972; 
Platt, et al., 1974), others have also failed to find a relationship between rumination and social problem 
solving impairment in a nonclinical sample using this measure (Donaldson & Lam, 2004). Similarly, the 
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measure of cognitive flexibility (i.e., the WCST) may have been an insufficient measure of flexible 
thinking in a sample lacking cognitive impairments.  
Associations involving social problem solving were generally weak. However, in terms of 
impersonal (or cognitive) problem solving (which has received less attention than social problem solving) 
two results are worth mentioning.  
First, and consistent with the study’s predictions, brooding, a specific and more detrimental aspect 
of rumination, was associated with poorer performance on the anagram task. This relationship existed 
irrespective of participants’ level of depression and was consistent with the study’s predictions. Moreover, 
this finding is consistent with other literature suggesting a link between rumination and impairments on 
cognitive problem solving tasks. For example, studies have demonstrated associations between rumination 
and concentration deficits (Lyubomirsky, et al., 2003) and impaired deliberate memory recall (Hertel, 
1998). It could be that brooding is cognitively taxing and reduces effectiveness in situations that require 
cognitive problem solving. 
 Secondly, and contrary to our hypothesis, cognitive inflexibility was associated with a faster 
solving time (among correctly solved anagrams). This finding is difficult to explain because cognitive 
flexibility is a hallmark of human executive functioning, which is known to facilitate effective problem 
solving. However, some researchers have found that increased cognitive flexibility comes at the cost of 
increased distractibility, particularly among those with moderately positive affective states (Dreisbach & 
Goschke, 2004). Perhaps among this sample, cognitive inflexibility was associated with an ability to more 
effectively tune out both internal (e.g., concerns about performance) and external (e.g., noise) distracters 
and perseverate on the task at hand, thus promoting faster solving times.  
One potential explanation for the general lack of support for the preliminary hypotheses is the low 
levels of depression seen in this sample. For example, many studies that have found a relationship between 
rumination and social problem solving impairment have seen these effects among dysphoric or depressed 
individuals (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). Similarly, cognitive flexibility more 
often appears to be compromised among depressed individuals, rather than nonclinical ruminators. 
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As such, an unplanned analysis was conducted to determine if depression moderated the 
relationship between rumination and problem solving4
This finding adds to an emerging literature on the paradoxical and sometimes contradictory 
findings about rumination, depression, and problem solving. For example, researchers have documented 
greater neurocognitive deficits (e.g., executive functioning impairment, visuo-spatial deficits) and poorer 
performance on laboratory problem solving tasks among depressed individuals when compared to those 
without depression (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001; Channon & Baker, 1996; Strack, et al., 1985; 
Veiel, 1997). However, others have reported that depression promotes an analytical style that actually 
enhances problem solving performance. Specifically, one study demonstrated that among 
economics/finance students, sad mood inductions led to more accurate decisions in a task that simulated 
real financial trading (Au, Chan, Wang, & Vertinsky, 2003). The depressive realism literature also suggests 
that depressed individuals are more accurate in estimating the amount of control they have in contingency-
based tasks (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) and are less likely to commit the fundamental attribution error 
compared to their nondepressed counterparts (Forgas, 1998). These results combined with this study’s 
findings suggest that depression combined with rumination, though impairing in some respects, might 
facilitate more careful analysis and more accurate task performance.  
. A significant interaction emerged, though not in the 
expected direction. Results from this sample suggest that rumination may enhance performance on 
cognitive problem solving tasks among those with depressive symptoms, while serving as a detriment to 
task performance among those without depressive symptoms. Although the literature on rumination and 
problem solving tends to emphasize social problem solving (rather than performance on 
impersonal/cognitive tasks), the general consensus of the social problem solving literature and the 
depression and problem solving literature led us to speculate that rumination would impair rather than 
enhance performance on this task among those with depressive symptoms.  
4.2. Mediation Results 
The results from this study failed to find support for the hypothesis that cognitive inflexibility 
would mediate the relationship between rumination and impaired problem solving. One potential 
                                                 
4 This analysis (and its results) were similar to a planned analysis conducted to determine if state 
rumination exerted more detrimental effects on problem solving among those with high depression 
compared to those with lower levels of depression; thus the implications are discussed only once. 
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explanation for this result is that the relationship between rumination and problem solving (c Path) was 
weak (-.13 to .02). However, this explanation is not satisfactory because theoretically mediation can occur 
even in the absence of a direct effect. Specifically, failing to model all of the potential mediators (i.e., 
multiple mediation) especially when the indirect (ab path) and direct (c path) effects have opposite signs 
(i.e., competitive mediation) can lead researchers to preemptively, and falsely, conclude that because there 
was no direct effect, mediation could not have occurred.  
A second potential explanation is that cognitive flexibility does not, in fact, mediate the 
relationship between rumination and problem solving ability. There may be other mediators that would 
need to be modeled that may represent potential, indirect ways in which rumination impacts problem 
solving. For example, other potential mediating mechanisms might be anhedonia, amotivation, or poor 
inhibition of a dominant response (i.e., rumination). In fact, some researchers have speculated that 
dysphoric rumination may reduce energy and motivation, and that this might lead to impaired problem 
solving ability and engagement (Lyubomirsky, et al., 1999). In another study comparing ruminators’ and 
nonruminators’ performance on a task-switching activity, the investigators found that rumination was 
associated with a decreased ability to inhibit a previously relevant task set. It might be that poor inhibition, 
rather than impaired set-shifting (i.e., cognitive inflexibility), is responsible for rumination’s affect on 
problem solving.  
A third plausible explanation is that our measure of cognitive inflexibility was not the best 
measure to detect perseveration. There are concerns that this test may be too simple for those without 
cognitive impairments (i.e., a nonclinical student sample), despite the fact that others have used this 
measure successfully with this population (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).  However, others have 
criticized the WCST for being overly complex and failing to more purely assess cognitive flexibility. 
Specifically, the WCST has been criticized for having poor construct validity and providing only one index 
of inflexibility (i.e., the number perseverative errors) (Meiran, Diamond, Toder, & Nemets, 2010; Miyake, 
et al., 2000). Perhaps a different (or multiple) measure(s) of cognitive inflexibility (e.g., task switching, 
which shows promise as a multifaceted measure of cognitive flexibility) combined with a multiple mediator 
model would further clarify the relationship between rumination and problem solving.  
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4.3. Moderation Results 
Additionally, our results failed to support the hypothesis that defusion would moderate the 
relationship between rumination and cognitive flexibility, suggesting that psychological distancing 
strategies, when examined singularly, exert little to no effect on the relationship between rumination and 
cognitive flexibility. One potential explanation for this finding lies in the low variability seen on the 
dependent variable measure. In general, students made relatively few perseverative errors as a whole, again 
raising concerns about this task’s simplicity. This positive skew – still somewhat evident after a 
transformation – in combination with low variability may have made it difficult to detect an effect if it 
existed, increasing the potential of a Type II error. 
Another possibility is that the relationship between rumination and cognitive flexibility is in fact 
reversed. For example, it could be that perseverative, rigid thinking styles predisopose individuals to 
ruminate because they may have difficulty shifting away from sad, or depressive thoughts. In fact, 
executive functions are aspects of one’s brain and therefore it may make more sense to examine cognitive 
flexibility as a predictor of rumination, rather than rumination as a predictor of inflexibility. Consider a 
study by Meiran and colleagues (2010) in which researchers, among other tests of executive functioning, 
administered tests of flexibility to individuals with OCD and UD. They sought to examine similarities and 
differences in the rigid thinking styles seen among those with obsessions and those with ruminations. The 
results demonstrated that both clinical groups had highly similar rigidity profiles, suggesting that cognitive 
inflexibility was a risk factor for these psychopathologies. Future studies might examine if rumination 
mediates the relationship between inflexibility and problem solving deficits. 
4.4. Post Hoc Results 
  It is well-recognized that rumination exacerbates and maintains depressive symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008). Learning to respond differently to ruminations by 
changing their content (e.g., via cognitive restructuring) or context (e.g., via psychological acceptance) may 
facilitate better coping and thus provide a protective effect against depressive symptoms known to arise as 
a result of depressive rumination. Although this study did not measure cognitive change strategies (e.g., 
modifying distorted thinking patterns), psychological acceptance/distancing strategies (e.g., defusion, 
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decentering) were assessed, and an unplanned analysis was conducted to determine if such strategies 
attenuated the relationship between rumination and depression.  
Results were consistent with what would have been predicted. The more individuals endorsed an 
ability to achieve psychological distance, the less detrimental were the effects of rumination in terms of 
self-reported depression. This finding is in concert with the findings from other studies examining how 
techniques from newer, acceptance-based therapies may have a beneficial impact on both rumination and 
dysphoria. For example, Jain and colleagues (Jain, et al., 2007) compared the effects of mindfulness 
meditation to relaxation training and a control condition on levels of distress and rumination. The 
mindfulness meditation intervention was superior to the control condition in reducing ruminative thoughts 
and behaviors; (the control condition did not significantly differ from the relaxation group). Another study 
found that following a dysphoric mood induction, those who were guided through a mindfulness meditation 
exercise showed significantly greater mood improvements than those who were induced to ruminate about 
or distract themselves from their dysphoria (Broderick, 2005).  
Other studies have found that reductions in rumination, following a mindfulness-based 
intervention, may themselves be responsible for reductions in depressed affect. For example, Teasedale and 
colleagues (2000) found that participants in a mindfulness-based cognitive therapy intervention, which 
taught recovering depressed patients (with at least three prior depressive episodes) to disengage from 
depressive thinking styles, were significantly less likely to relapse compared to those who received 
treatment as usual (Teasdale, et al., 2000). Another study compared a mindfulness-mediation intervention 
to a wait-list control for those who met lifetime diagnostic criteria for a mood disorder (Ramel, Goldin, 
Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004). Individuals’ reductions in rumination following the intervention were 
significant even when controlling for depression, but not vice versa, suggesting that changes in rumination 
explained a substantial portion of the decreases in affective symptoms (rather than the other way around). 
Taken together, these findings support the notion that being able to psychologically distance oneself from 
ones ruminations may have benefits for dysphoric mood and/or risk of MDD relapse. Moreover, 
mindfulness-based interventions may exert their beneficial effects on dysphoria through their impact on 
rumination. 
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Interestingly, in this study, psychological acceptance - a related construct that describes an 
individual’s ability to respond nonjudgmentally to a negative psychological event without attempting to 
alter or control it – did not have the same effect, suggesting that psychological acceptance is functionally 
different from psychological distancing in the context of the rumination-depression relationship. One 
explanation is that psychological distancing encourages a greater amount of disengagement from thoughts, 
relative to acceptance of thoughts. Items on this measure of acceptance (i.e., PHLMS) such as: “I try to put 
problems out of my mind” and “I tell myself I shouldn’t have certain thoughts” may, if negatively 
endorsed, actually reflect a tendency toward dwelling on or engaging with certain thoughts. Thus, this 
measure might be capturing different constructs for different individuals, i.e., acceptance for some, 
dwelling for others.  
4.5. Clinical Implications 
 The results from this study inform clinical decision making in a few ways. First, it appears that 
rumination impacts problem solving differently, depending on one’s level of depression. For those with low 
levels of depression, rumination might be more impairing in terms cognitive performance. However, for 
those who have moderate levels of depression, rumination may be somewhat beneficial in facilitating 
problem solving. Clinicians working with depressed patients should conduct a functional analysis to 
determine how rumination might be enhancing or impairing behavioral effectiveness. Rumination may in 
fact promote a resolution of problems that may be implicated in one’s depression.  
Recently, some researchers (Andrews & Thomson, 2009) have proposed what they term the 
analytical rumination hypothesis. Their thesis is that depression is an evolved response to complicated 
problems that require sustained and time consuming analysis. Associated symptoms, like anhedonia (which 
reduces one’s desire to engage in distracting and irrelevant activities), social isolation (which reduces 
exposure to disruptive stimuli), and rumination (which is persistent and resistant to distraction, thereby 
giving mental priority to problem-related information) facilitate the resolution of such problems. This 
theory, taken together with research findings demonstrating that systematic disruption of ruminative 
processes may prolong depressive episodes (A. M. Hayes, Beevers, Feldman, Laurenceau, & Perlman, 
2005; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003), suggests that clinicians should not regard rumination as entirely 
detrimental to all individuals. One study of an integrative treatment of depression found that expressive 
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writing, an exercise in which depressed patients were encouraged to “explore” their feelings of 
hopelessness and sense of failure, if done in a structured way, was associated with symptom improvement 
(A. M. Hayes, et al., 2005). Focusing on one’s depressive symptoms, in a structured clinical context (and 
preventing degradation into pathological, repetitive though), may encourage problem-focused coping for 
those with moderate depression. 
Second, psychological distancing strategies appear to have a beneficial impact for ruminators, in 
that they alleviate the intensity of depressive symptoms. Training patients to regard their ruminations with 
curiosity and from a more objective and removed perspective may make it less likely that they will 
experience the detrimental mood consequences. Techniques like mindfulness meditation or specific 
defusion exercises, e.g., Milk, Milk, Milk; Jack and Jill exercise (S. C. Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999), when 
employed clinically, seek to emphasize the habitual and automatic nature of the mind/thinking and foster a 
more distanced or decentered perspective so that the individual has a more flexible notion of self and the 
behavioral options at his/her disposal. Decentering or defusion exercises might exert benefits in both 
reducing the intensity of one’s symptoms and facilitating engagement in values-consistent behaviors. 
4.6. Strengths and Limitations 
 This study was one of, if not the first to examine rumination, cognitive inflexibility, and problem 
solving impairments in a single model. Moreover, this study utilized a sophisticated measure of mediation 
to analyze these findings. Bootstrapping, a resampling approach to mediation, is superior to other, more 
traditional tests of mediation. Although, the cross-sectional data precluded statements about causality and 
preliminary analyses failed to find a direct effect, this method is recommended for a few reasons. First, the 
test does not assume that the variables or the sampling distribution (of the indirect effect) are normal. 
Second, this method does not hinge on the significance of the a, b, and c paths, rather the emphasis of the 
analysis is on the size of the indirect effect. Third, this method is superior in reducing Type I error rates, 
and thus is particularly useful in studies with smaller sample sizes.  
However, a few limitations should be noted. First, the data were cross-sectional limiting our 
ability to draw causal conclusions and make statements about the temporal nature of these variables, 
namely rumination and problem solving. Longitudinal studies are needed to clarify the nature of the 
relationship between rumination and problem solving. As it currently stands, depressive rumination theory 
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is unclear about the direction of this relationship. On the one hand,  rumination is conceptualized as a mode 
of responding to distress, wherein individuals remain fixated on their problems without actively solving 
them (Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008). Thus, it could be that the problems on which the ruminator is fixated 
have arisen due to poor problem solving abilities. On the other hand, however, depressive rumination 
theory proposes that rumination leads to depression in part because of rumination’s impact on problem 
solving, suggesting that rumination precedes problem solving impairment. Although there is a strong 
possibility that this relationship is bidirectional, longitudinal designs could permit stronger conclusions 
about the nature of this relationship (e.g., In which contexts does rumination lead to problem solving 
deficits? Or under what circumstances does poor problem solving give rise to rumination?). 
Second, our sample was a nonclinical group of generally, high functioning students. One potential 
consequence of using a nonclinical sample is that there may not have been sufficient levels of impairment 
to detect the relationship between rumination and problem solving or the relationship between rumination 
and cognitive inflexibility. One possibility is that the measures of social problem solving and cognitive 
flexibility were not sensitive enough to validly measure these constructs in a high functioning sample. As 
such, there is a possibility that the results would be different among those with current major depression or 
a lifetime history of depressive episodes. Future studies might address these issues by including other 
comparison groups (e.g., currently depressed, recovering depressed, nondepressed first-degree relatives of 
depressed individuals) to determine how these relationships differ among those with varying histories of 
depression. Another possibility would be to include other measures of social problem solving (e.g., 
behavioral observation) and cognitive flexibility (e.g., tests with more complex contingencies, and better 
construct validities, i.e., task switching) that might pose more of a challenge to a nonclinical sample and 
provide a purer measure of rigid thinking.  
Additionally, there were some psychometric limitations worth mentioning. For example, in 
comparison to another study that used the MEPS, the current sample had less variability (i.e., smaller range, 
lower standard deviation) in terms of the number of means/strategies produced, thus making it possible that 
there was not enough variability to detect an effect (Gotlib & Asarnow, 1979). Secondly, although the 
variability (i.e., standard deviation) in the number of perseverative errors was comparable to results 
reported in one study (Deveney & Deldin, 2006), it was substantially higher than the variability reported in 
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another study (D. J. Martin, et al., 1991). Excessive variability can introduce more error, also making it 
harder to detect an effect. Finally, there were no available norms regarding performance on the anagram 
task, limiting our ability to make conclusions about this sample’s performance relative to the population’s 
performance. The results suggest that rumination had an effect on problem solving and that this effect 
depended on the level of one’s depression. However, it remains unclear whether rumination enhanced 
problem solving ability for individuals with greater depressive symptoms or simply failed to worsen it.  
4.7. Conclusions and Future Directions 
In conclusion, this study’s results suggest that rumination may have some beneficial aspects 
related to problem solving and that psychological distancing strategies may buffer ruminators’ tendency 
toward depressed mood. This study did not find support for the hypothesis that cognitive inflexibility 
mediated the relationship between rumination and problem solving, or that psychological distancing 
attenuates the relationship between rumination and cognitive inflexibility. 
Future studies should more adequately articulate the relationship between rumination and problem 
solving. Research has often yielded contradictory evidence about the benefits and detriments of rumination 
(see Andrews & Thomson, 2009 for a review). The results from this study suggest that depression might 
alter the nature of this relationship, but perhaps other moderating variables should be considered (e.g., self-
efficacy, social support, appraisals about problem solving ability). Additionally, as some have pointed out, 
there may be some beneficial aspects of rumination (e.g., curious reflection) that are more adaptive than 
other aspects (e.g., brooding) (Treynor, et al., 2003). Moreover, future research should identify mechanisms 
through which rumination exerts its effects on problem solving.  In light of the research on some of the 
benefits of an analytical, ruminative style, it would not be surprising if some executive functioning aspects 
mediated the relationship between rumination and problem solving enhancement. Studies examining these 
questions among nonclinical and depressed participants and employing a longitudinal methodology (with 
subsequent, sophisticated meditational analyses) would be best suited to address these questions.  
Depression is a leading cause of disability worldwide (Murray & Lopez, 1997). Thus, research 
efforts should continue in an attempt to find out what interventions work best for whom (moderation 
analyses), and how these interventions exert their benefits (meditational analyses) to improve treatment 
response. Results from this study suggest that cognitive distancing strategies may be one way in which 
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ruminating individuals can be protected from depression severity. Future investigations might also address 
whether cognitive distancing strategies (that alter the context of depressive thinking) are qualitatively 
different from cognitive restructuring strategies (that alter the content of depressive thinking), and if one 
strategy might be more successful in treating depression depending on other, individual factors. 
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APPENDIX A: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Sample Characteristics 
 
  
n 
 
Percentage 
 
Gender 
  
Male 39 40.2 
Female 58 59.8 
 
Student Status 
  
Full-time 92 94.8 
Part-time 5 5.2 
 
US Citizenship 
  
Yes 71 73.2 
No 26 26.8 
 
Native English Speaker 
  
Yes 72 74.2 
No 25 25.8 
 
Ethnicity 
  
African American 7 7.2 
Caribbean/Haitian 1 1.0 
Asian American/Asian/Pacific Islander 33 34.0 
White/European American 49 50.5 
European 1 1.0 
Latino/Latina/Hispanic 1 1.0 
Multiracial 2 2.1 
Other 3 3.1 
 
Relationship Status 
  
Single 91 93.8 
Living with partner/married 3 3.1 
Not living with current partner 3 3.1 
 
Employment Status 
  
Full-time 7 7.2 
Part-time 29 29.9 
Occasional 16 16.5 
No income 45 46.4 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Measure 
 
 
Mean 
 
Standard Deviation 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
RRS-Trait 48.27 12.47 22 77 
RRS-State 36.37 13.71 22 76 
Brooding-Trait 11.42 3.44 5 20 
Brooding-State 8.94 3.65 5 20 
Avg # Means (MEPS)† 4.10 1.34 1.38 9.37 
Avg Effectiveness (MEPS)† 3.82 .90 2 6.38 
# of correct anagrams 10.22 4.43 0 19 
Time to correctly solve anagrams  29.71 22.95 3.38 114.97 
WCST-PE 8.04 6.31 3 54 
DDS-Combined 39.54 10.98 16 75 
EQ 36.36 5.88 23 51 
PHLMS-Acceptance 28.90 6.75 12 43 
BDI 10.60 8.66 0 43 
 
Note.  RRS=Ruminative Responses Scale; MEPS=Means End Problem Solving Task; WCST-
PE=Wisconsin Card Sorting Task – Perseverative Errors; DDS=Drexel Defusion Scale; EQ=Experiences 
Questionnaire; PHLMS=Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale; BDI-II=Beck Depression Inventory – 2nd Edition. 
†Two individuals were missing MEPS data due to audio-recorder malfunctions.
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Table 3 
 
Correlation Coefficients for the Relationships between Rumination and Brooding and Problem Solving Variables 
 
  
T. Rum 
 
S. Rum 
 
T. Brood 
 
S. Brood 
 
MEPS 
Means 
 
MEPS 
Effect 
 
# Correct 
Anagrams 
 
Time to correctly 
solve 
 
T. Rum - .70** .83** .59** -.02 .02 -.13 -.06 
S. Rum  - .62** .87** -.10 -.05 -.14 -.15 
T. Brood   - .68** -.05 .04 -.19 -.09 
S. Brood    - -.06 .00 -.20* -.10 
MEPS Means     - .90** -.13 .13 
MEPS Effect      - -.16 .10 
# Correct Anagrams       - .36** 
Time to correctly solve        - 
 
Note.  * p < .05;  ** p < .01 
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Table 3b 
 
β Values from Multiple Regressions Analyzing the Relationship between Rumination/Brooding and Problem Solving Variables while Controlling for 
Depression 
 
  
MEPS Means 
 
MEPS Effect 
 
# Correct Anagrams 
 
Time to correctly solve 
 
Trait Rumination .06 .09 -.17 .06 
 
State Rumination -.06 -.02 -.20 -.07 
 
Trait Brooding .01 
 
.10 -.24 .00 
State Brooding 
 
-.01 .05 -.25 -.03 
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Table 4 
 
Correlation Coefficients for the Relationships between Rumination and Cognitive Inflexibility (i.e, 
perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test).  
 
 
Note.  * p < .05;  ** p < .01 
 
 
 
   
  
Trait Rum 
 
State Rum 
 
Trait Brood 
 
State Brood 
 
# of 
Perseverative 
Errors 
T. Rum - .70** .83** .59** -.04 
S. Rum  - .62** .87** .03 
T. Brood   - .68** .04 
S. Brood    - -.02 
# Perseverative errors     - 
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Table 4b 
 
β Values from Multiple Regressions Analyzing the Relationship Between Rumination and Cognitive 
Inflexibility (i.e, perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test), while Controlling for 
Depression and Nonperseverative Errors. 
 
 
 
    
# of Perseverative Errors 
T. Rum -.04 
S. Rum -.10 
T. Brood -.02 
S. Brood -.10 
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Table 5 
 
Correlation Coefficients for the Relationships between Cognitive Inflexibility (i.e, perseverative errors on 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) and Problem Solving Variables. 
 
 
 
Note.  * p < .05;  ** p < .01 
  
  
# of 
Perseverative 
Errors 
 
MEPS 
Means 
 
MEPS 
Effect 
 
# Correct 
Anagrams 
 
Time to 
correctly 
solve 
# Perseverative errors - .07 .07 -.17 -.32** 
MEPS # of Means  - .90** -.13 .13 
MEPS Effectiveness   - -.16 .10 
# of correct Anagrams    - .36** 
Time to correctly solve     - 
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Table 5b 
 
β Values from Multiple Regressions Analyzing the Relationship Between Cognitive Inflexibility (i.e, 
perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) and Problem Solving while Controlling for 
Depression and Nonperseverative Errors.  
  
MEPS Means 
 
MEPS 
Effect 
 
# Correct 
Anagrams 
 
Time to 
correctly 
solve 
 
# Perseverative errors 
 
.13 
 
.13 
 
-.12 
 
-.31** 
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Table 6  
 
Indirect Effects of Trait Rumination on Various Problem Solving Variables through Cognitive Inflexibility 
(i.e., number of perseverative errors on the WCST) 
 
 
 
Note.  Based on 5,000 bootstrap samples. SE = standard error; BC = bias corrected; CI = confidence 
interval. 
  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Bootstrap 
estimate 
 
SE 
 
BC 95% CI 
lower 
 
BC 95% CI 
higher 
 
MEPS Means 
 
-.0005 
 
.0016 
 
-.0067 
 
.0012 
MEPS Effectiveness -.0003 .0007 -.0048 .0008 
Number of correct anagrams .0023 .0068 -.0084 .0220 
Mean time to solve correct .0211 .0604 -.0914 .1412 
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Table 7  
 
Indirect Effects of State Rumination, Trait Brooding, and State Brooding on Problem Solving Variables 
through Cognitive Inflexibility (i.e., number of perseverative errors on the WCST) 
 
 
 
 
Note.  Based on 5,000 bootstrap samples. SE = standard error; BC = bias corrected; CI = confidence 
interval. 
  
 
(Independent Variable) 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
Bootstrap 
estimate 
 
 
SE 
 
 
BC 95% CI 
lower 
 
 
BC 95% CI 
higher 
 
(State Rumination) 
MEPS Means 
 
 
.0002 
 
 
.0018 
 
 
-.0016 
 
 
.0059 
MEPS Effectiveness .0001 .0012 -.0011 .0037 
Number of correct anagrams -.0014 .0062 -.0191 .0083 
Mean time to solve correct -.0179 .0556 -.1363 .0883 
 
(Trait Brooding)     
MEPS Means .0000 .0051 -.0096 .0117 
MEPS Effectiveness .0000 .0034 -.0065 .0073 
Number of correct anagrams -.0081 .0237 -.0822 .0255 
Mean time to solve correct -.0871 .2104 -.5549 .2860 
 
(State Brooding)     
MEPS Means -.0005 .0062 -.0067 .0180 
MEPS Effectiveness -.0023 .0052 -.0218 .0024 
Number of correct anagrams -.0043 .0232 -.0696 .0315 
Mean time to solve correct -.0594 .2045 -.5213 .2892 
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Table 8  
 
The Moderating Effect of Defusion and Decentering on the Relationship between Rumination/Brooding and 
Cognitive Inflexibility 
  
(Independent Variable) 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
b 
 
β 
 
SE 
 
t 
 
p value 
 
 
(Defusion) 
Trait rumination 
 
 
.000 
 
 
.015 
 
 
.000 
 
 
.137 
 
 
.891 
State rumination -.000 -.049 .000 -.446 .657 
Trait brooding .000 .022 .001 .201 .841 
State brooding -.000 -.053 .000 -.498 .619 
 
(Decentering)      
Trait rumination .000 -.047 .000 -.454 .651 
State rumination .001 .065 .002 .624 .534 
Trait brooding .000 -.019 .001 -.179 .858 
State brooding -.001 -.098 .001 -.962 .339 
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Table 8b 
 
β Values from Multiple Regressions Examining The Moderating Effect of Defusion and Decentering on the 
Relationship between Rumination/Brooding and Cognitive Inflexibility While Controlling for Depression 
and Nonperseverative Errors 
 
  
  
 
β 
 
Defusion × Trait Rumination 
 
 
-.016 
Defusion × State Rumination -.045 
 
Defusion × Trait Brooding -.009 
 
Defusion × State Brooding 
 
 
-.040 
 
Decentering  × Trait Rumination 
 
-.031 
 
Decentering × State Rumination 
 
-.094 
 
Decentering × Trait Brooding 
 
-.025 
 
Decentering × State Brooding 
 
-.030 
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Figure 1.  Proposed model of mediation examining whether cognitive inflexibility mediates the relationship 
between rumination and impaired problem solving. 
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Figure 2.  Proposed model of the moderating effect ofdefusion on the relationship between rumination and 
problem solving. 
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Figure 3.  Proposed model of the moderating effect of defusion on the relationship between rumination and 
cognitive flexibility.  
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Figure 4.  The relationship between rumination and problem solving (i.e., number of correctly solved 
anagrams) contrasted by level of depression (Very Low/High=2 SD below/above the mean; 
Low/High=1SD below/above the mean). 
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Figure 5.  The relationship between state rumination and problem solving (i.e., number of correctly solved 
anagrams) contrasted by level of depression (Very Low/High=2 SD below/above the mean; 
Low/High=1SD below/above the mean). 
  
  
Level of Depression 
# of 
correctly 
solved 
Rumination 
65 
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
1 6 11 16 21
High 
Defusion
Mean 
Defusion
Low 
Defusion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  The relationship between rumination and depression (i.e., score on the BDI) contrasted by three 
levels of defusion (Low=1 SD below the mean; High=1SD above the mean). 
 
Note.  BDI = Beck Depression Inventory. 
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Figure 7.  The relationship between rumination and depression (i.e., score on the BDI) contrasted by three 
levels of decentering (Low=1 SD below the mean; High=1SD above the mean). 
  
Note.  BDI = Beck Depression Inventory. 
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APPENDIX B: Measures 
 
Demographic Form 
Employment status: 
(0)   full-time     (1)   part-time    (2)   occasional   (3)   disability/SSI     (4)   no income 
 
Student status  
(0)   full-time        (1)   part-time 
 
Age       
 
Student type 
(0)   undergraduate (1)   graduate 
 
Marital/relationship status: 
   (0)   single (no current romantic partner)        (1)   divorced         (2)   widowed 
   (3)   living with partner/married       (4)    not living with current partner 
 
Ethnicity (check all that apply): 
 (0)  African American / Black 
 (1)  Caribbean / Haitian 
 (2)  African 
 (3)  Asian American 
 (4)  Asian / Pacific-Islander 
 (5)  White / European American / Caucasian 
 (6)  European 
 (7)  Latino/Latina / Hispanic American / Hispanic 
 (8)  Native American / American Indian 
 (9)  Multiracial 
 (10)  Other:        
 
Is English your first language? 
 (0)  No; I learned starting at age:       
 (1)  Yes 
 
Were you born in the U.S.? 
 (0)  No; I was born in:       
 (1)  Yes 
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DDS 
 
Defusion is a term used by psychologists to describe a state of achieving distance from internal experiences 
such as thoughts and feelings.  Suppose you put your hands over your face and someone asks you, “What 
do hands look like?”  You might answer, “They are all dark.”  If you held your hands out a few inches 
away, you might add, “they have fingers and lines in them.” In a similar way, getting some distance from 
your thoughts allows you to see them for what they are.  The point is to notice the process of thinking as it 
happens rather than only noticing the results of that process, in other words, your thoughts.  When you 
think a thought, it “colors” your world.  When you see a thought from a distance, you can still see how it 
“colors” your world (you understand what it means), but you also see that you are doing the “coloring.”  It 
would be as if you always wore yellow sunglasses and forgot you were wearing them.  Defusion is like 
taking off your glasses and holding them several inches away from your face; then you can see how they 
make the world appear to be yellow instead of only seeing the yellow world. 
 
Similarly, when you are defused from an emotion you can see yourself having the emotion, rather than 
simply being in it.  When you are defused from a craving or a sensation of pain, you don’t just experience 
the craving or pain, you see yourself having them.  Defusion allows you to see thoughts, feelings, cravings, 
and pain as simply processes taking place in your brain.  The more defused you are from thoughts or 
feelings, the less automatically you act on them. 
 
For example, you may do something embarrassing and have the thought “I’m such an idiot.”  If you are 
able to defuse from this thought, you will be able to see it as just a thought.  In other words you can see that 
the thought is something in your mind that may or may not be true.  If you are not able to defuse, you 
would take the thought as literally true, and your feelings and actions would automatically be impacted by 
the thought. 
 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 
  Not at all 
(completely 
fused; see 
the thought 
as complete 
truth) 
A 
little 
Somewhat Moderately Quite 
a lot 
Very much 
(completely 
defused; 
see the 
thought as 
just a 
thought) 
1 Feelings of Anger.  You 
become angry when 
someone takes your place 
in a long line.  To what 
extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from feelings of anger? 
      
2 Cravings for Food.  You 
see your favorite food and 
have the urge to eat it.  To 
what extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from cravings for food? 
      
3 Physical Pain.  Imagine 
that you bang your knee 
on a table leg.  To what 
extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from physical pain? 
      
4 Anxious Thoughts.  
Things have not been       
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going well at school or at 
your job, and work just 
keeps piling up.  To what 
extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from anxious thoughts 
like “I’ll never get this 
done.”? 
5 Thoughts of self.  Imagine 
you are having a thought 
such as “no one likes me.”  
To what extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from negative thoughts 
about yourself? 
      
6 Thoughts of 
Hopelessness.  You are 
feeling sad and stuck in a 
difficult situation that has 
no obvious end in sight.  
You experience thoughts 
such as “Things will never 
get any better.”  To what 
extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from thoughts of 
hopelessness? 
      
7 Thoughts about 
motivation or ability.  
Imagine you are having a 
thought such as “I can’t 
do this” or “I just can’t get 
started.”  To what extent 
would you normally be 
able to defuse from 
thoughts about motivation 
or ability? 
      
8 Thoughts about Your 
Future.  Imagine you are 
having thoughts like, “I’ll 
never make it” or “I have 
no future.”  To what 
extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from thoughts about your 
future? 
      
9 Sensations of Fear.  You 
are about to give a 
presentation to a large 
group. As you sit waiting 
your turn, you start to 
notice your heart racing, 
butterflies in your 
stomach, and your hands 
trembling.  To what extent 
would you normally be 
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able to defuse from 
sensations of fear? 
10 Feelings of Sadness.  
Imagine that you lose out 
on something you really 
wanted.  You have 
feelings of sadness.  To 
what extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from feelings of sadness? 
      
11 Ruminative Thoughts. 
You have been feeling 
down and depressed for 
several weeks. These 
feelings persist and it 
seems like there is no end 
in sight. You begin to 
think, “what am I doing to 
deserve this?” To what 
extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from a thought like this? 
      
12 Ruminative Thoughts. 
Imagine that your mood 
begins to worsen.  As a 
result your sleep and 
eating habits change, you 
notice changes in your 
energy level, and you start 
to feel bad about yourself. 
You notice yourself 
thinking “Why do I 
always react this way?” 
To what extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from a thought like this? 
      
13 Ruminative Thoughts. 
Imagine you’ve been 
feeling low for several 
weeks. You can’t help but 
notice that other people 
don’t seem weighed down 
by feelings of sadness and 
you think to yourself: 
“Why do I have problems 
other people don’t have?” 
To what extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
from a thought like this? 
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14 Ruminative Thoughts. 
You have been feeling 
down and unmotivated to 
the point that things start 
to build up and become 
overwhelming. Still, you 
are unable to get moving 
and think to yourself 
“Why can’t I handle 
things better?” To what 
extent would you 
normally be able to defuse 
form a thought like this? 
      
15 Ruminative Thoughts. 
You notice your mood 
becoming more depressed 
and you notice your 
school and work 
performance begin to 
suffer. You think, “I 
won’t be able to do my 
job if I don’t snap out of 
this.” To what extent 
would you normally be 
able to defuse from a 
thought like this? 
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PHL-MS 
 
Instructions:  Please circle how often you experienced each of the following statements within the past 
week.   
 
1.  I am aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
2.  I try to distract myself when I feel unpleasant emotions. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
3.  When talking with other people, I am aware of their facial and body expressions. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
4.  There are aspects of myself I don’t want to think about. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
5.  When I shower, I am aware of how the water is running over my body. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
6.  I try to stay busy to keep thoughts or feelings from coming to mind. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
7.  When I am startled, I notice what is going on inside my body. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
8.  I wish I could control my emotions more easily. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
9.  When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels against my face. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
10.  I tell myself that I shouldn’t have certain thoughts. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
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11.  When someone asks how I am feeling, I can identify my emotions easily. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
12.  There are things I try not to think about. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
13.  I am aware of thoughts I’m having when my mood changes. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
14.  I tell myself that I shouldn’t feel sad. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
15.  I notice changes inside my body, like my heart beating faster or my muscles getting tense. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
16.  If there is something I don’t want to think about, I’ll try many things to get it out of my mind. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
17.  Whenever my emotions change, I am conscious of them immediately. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
18.  I try to put my problems out of mind. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
19.  When talking with other people, I am aware of the emotions I am experiencing. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
20.  When I have a bad memory, I try to distract myself to make it go away. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes Often  Very Often 
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EQ 
  Never Rarely Sometimes Often All the time 
1 I think about what will happen in the future 1 2 3 4 5 
2 I remind myself that thoughts aren’t facts. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 I am better able to accept myself as I am. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 I notice all sorts of little things and details in the world around me. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 I am kinder to myself when things go wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 I can slow my thinking at times of stress. 1 2 3 4 5 
7 I wonder what kind of person I really am. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 I am not so easily carried away by my thoughts and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 I notice that I don’t take difficulties so personally. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 I can separate myself from my thoughts and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 
11 I analyze why things turn out the way they do. 1 2 3 4 5 
12 I can take time to respond to difficulties. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 I think over and over again about what others have said to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 I can treat myself kindly. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 I can observe unpleasant feelings without being drawn into them. 1 2 3 4 5 
16 I have the sense that I am fully aware of what is going on around me and inside me. 1 2 3 4 5 
17 I can actually see that I am not my thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 I am consciously aware of a sense of my body as a whole. 1 2 3 4 5 
19 I think about the ways in which I am different from other people. 1 2 3 4 5 
20 I view things from a wider perspective. 1 2 3 4 5 
                                              
 
 
 
RRS - Trait 
 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each of the items 
below and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often or always think or do each one when you 
feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you 
should do. 
 
 
1 = almost never 2 = sometimes 3 = often 4 = almost always 
 
 
1. Think about how alone you feel  _____ 
2. Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this.”  _____ 
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness  _____ 
4. Think about how hard it is to concentrate  _____  
5. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?”  _____  
6. Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel  _____  
7. Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed  _____ 
8. Think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore  _____ 
9. Think “Why can’t I get going?”  _____ 
10. Think “Why do I always react this way?”  _____ 
11. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way  _____ 
12. Write down what you are thinking and analyze it  _____ 
13. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better  _____ 
14. Think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.”  _____ 
15. Think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”  _____ 
16. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?”  _____ 
17. Think about how sad you feel  _____ 
18. Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes  _____ 
19. Think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything  _____ 
20. Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed  _____ 
21. Go someplace alone to think about your feelings  _____ 
22. Think about how angry you are with yourself  _____ 
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BDI-II 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements 
carefully, and pick out the one statementin each group which best describes the way you have been feeling 
during the past two weeks including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If 
several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be 
sure that you do not choose more than one statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in 
Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite). 
 
1. Sadness 7. Self Dislike 
0 I do not feel sad. 0 I feel the same about myself as ever. 
1 I feel sad much of the time. 1 I have lost confidence in myself. 
2 I am sad all the time. 2 I am disappointed in myself. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 3 I dislike myself. 
2. Pessimism 8. Self Criticism 
0 I am not discouraged about my future. 0 I don’t criticize or blame myself any more 
than usual. 
1 I feel more discouraged about my future 
than I used to be. 
1 I am more critical of myself than I used to 
be. 
2 I do not expect things to work out for me. 2 I criticize myself for all my faults. 
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get 
worse. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that 
happens. 
3. Past Failure 9. Suicidal Thoughts and Dying 
0 I do not feel like a failure. 0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 I have failed more than I should have. 1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I 
would not carry them out. 
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person. 3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
4. Loss of Pleasure 10. Crying 
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the 
things I enjoy. 
0 I don’t cry any more than I used to. 
1 I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to. 1 I cry more now than I used to. 
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I 
used to enjoy. 
2 I cry over every little thing. 
3 I can’t get any pleasure from the things I 
used to enjoy. 
3 I feel like crying, but I can’t. 
5. Guilty Feelings 11. Agitation  
0 I don’t feel particularly guilty. 0 I am no more restless or wound up than 
usual. 
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or 
should have done. 
1 I feel more restless or would up than usual. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 2 I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to 
stay still. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 3 I am so restless or agitated I have to keep 
moving or doing something. 
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6. Punishment Feelings 12. Loss of Interest 
0 I don’t feel I am being punished. 0 I have not lost interest in other people or 
activities. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 1 I am less interested in other people or 
things than before. 
2 I expect to be punished. 2 I have lost most interest in other people or 
things. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 3 It’s hard to get interested in anything. 
13. Indecisiveness 18. Changes in Appetite 
0 I make decisions about as well as I ever did. 0 I have not experienced any changes in my 
appetite. 
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions 
than usual. 
1a My appetite is somewhat less than usual. 
2 I have much greater difficulty in making 
decisions than I used to. 
1b My appetite is somewhat greater than usual. 
3 I have trouble making any decisions. 2a My appetite is much less than usual. 
14. Worthlessness 2b My appetite is much greater than usual. 
0 I do not feel I am worthless. 3a I have no appetite at all. 
1 I don’t consider myself as worthwhile or 
useful as I used to. 
3b I crave food all the time. 
2 I feel more worthless compared to other 
people. 
19. Concentration Difficulty 
3 I feel utterly worthless. 0 I can concentrate as well as ever. 
15. Loss of Energy 1 I can’t concentrate as well as usual. 
0 I have as much energy as ever. 2 It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for 
very long. 
1 I have less energy than I used to have. 3 I find I can’t concentrate on anything. 
2 I don’t have enough energy to do very 
much. 
20. Tiredness or Fatigue 
3 I don’t have enough energy to do anything. 0 I don’t get more tired than usual. 
16. Change in Sleeping Pattern 1 I get tired or fatigued more easily than 
usual. 
0 I have not experienced any change in my 
sleeping pattern. 
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the 
things I used to do. 
1a I sleep somewhat more than usual. 3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the 
things I used to do. 
1b I sleep somewhat less than usual. 21. Loss of Interest in Sex 
2a I sleep a lot more than usual. 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my 
interest in sex. 
2b I sleep a lot less than usual. 1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
3a I sleep most of the day. 2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back 
to sleep. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
17. Irritability   
0 I am no more irritable than usual.   
1 I am more irritable than usual.   
2 I am much more irritable than usual.   
3 I am irritable all the time.   
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RRS - State 
 
A number of statements reflecting how people think are described below. Please read each of the items 
below and indicate how you are thinking right now, at this moment. Do not spend too much time on any 
one statement but give the answer which seems to best describe your present state. 
 
 
1 = not at all 2 = somewhat 3 = moderately so 4 = very much so 
 
 
1. Thinking about how alone you feel  _____ 
2. Thinking “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this.”  _____ 
3. Thinking about your feelings of fatigue and achiness  _____ 
4. Thinking about how hard it is to concentrate  _____  
5. Thinking “What am I doing to deserve this?”  _____  
6. Thinking about how passive and unmotivated you feel  _____  
7. Analyzing recent events to try to understand why you are depressed  _____ 
8. Thinking about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore  _____ 
9. Thinking “Why can’t I get going?”  _____ 
10. Thinking “Why do I always react this way?”  _____ 
11. Wanting to go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way  _____ 
12. Wanting to write down what you are thinking and analyze it  _____ 
13. Thinking about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better  _____ 
14. Thinking “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.”  _____ 
15. Thinking “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”  _____ 
16. Thinking “Why can’t I handle things better?”  _____ 
17. Thinking about how sad you feel  _____ 
18. Thinking about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes  _____ 
19. Think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything  _____ 
20. Analyzing your personality to try to understand why you are depressed  _____ 
21. Wanting to go someplace alone to think about your feelings  _____ 
22. Thinking about how angry you are with yourself _____ 
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WCST 
 
Sample screen. 
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MEPS 
 
Instructions 
 
In this procedure we are interested in how you solve problems. You will be given a number of stories to 
complete. For each story you will be given the beginning of the story and how the story ends. We would 
like you to provide the ideal strategy that will allow the beginning and end of the story to become 
connected. We would like you to describe this strategy in very specific terms so that it would be possible 
for anyone to follow your plan of action. 
 
(a) You realize that a friend is avoiding you  
 
You notice that your friends seemed to be avoiding you. You wanted to have friends and be liked. The story 
ends when your friends liking you again. You begin where you first notice your friends avoiding you. 
 
(b) Your partner tells you that he or she is very angry with you 
 
You love your partner very much, but have had many arguments. One day your partner left you. You 
wanted things to be better. The story ends with everything fine between you and your partner. You begin 
the story with your partner leaving you after an argument. 
 
(c) You are having trouble at work because you don’t get along with your boss  
 
You are having trouble getting along with the boss at your job. You are very unhappy about this. The story 
ends with your boss liking you. You begin the story where you aren’t getting along with your boss. 
 
(d) You have moved to a new area and don’t know anyone 
 
You had just moved in that day and didn’t know anyone. You wanted to have friends in the neighborhood. 
The story ends with you having many good friends and feeling at home in the neighborhood. You begin the 
story in your room immediately after arriving in the neighborhood. 
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Anagram Task 
 
You will be asked to solve some anagrams. As you know anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. 
They problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a word. When you’ve found the word tell me 
what it is [over the intercom system]. [Now, (subject’s name), there could be a pattern or principle by 
which to solve the anagrams. But that’s up to you to figure out. I can’t answer any questions now.] [After 
the experiment is over, I’ll answer any questions and pay you for your time.] 
 
Word  3-4-2-5-1  Anagram  Anagram* Median Solution Time*   
 
GROIN   O-I-R-N-G  R-N-O-G-I  35.0 
VOICE  I-C-O-E-V  E-O-C-V-I  4.0 
PANIC  N-I-A-C-P  P-N-C-I-A  65.0 
COBRA  B-R-O-A-C  O-B-R-A-C  50.5 
AUDIT  D-I-U-T-A  D-T-U-A-I  159.0 
HAVOC V-O-A-C-H  A-C-O-H-V  86.5 
CLOTH  O-T-L-H-C  L-C-O-H-T  9.0 
POUND  U-N-O-D-P  U-O-D-N-P  17.0 
ADOPT  O-P-D-T-A  D-P-O-A-T  42.0 
PATIO  T-I-A-O-P  P-A-T-O-I  22.0 
GIANT  A-N-I-T-G  I-G-T-N-A  29.0 
UNCLE  C-L-N-E-U  E-U-C-N-L  72.0 
APRON  R-O-P-N-A  O-A-P-N-R  132.0 
YOUTH  U-T-O-H-Y  O-H-Y-T-U  18.0 
TANGO  N-G-A-O-T  T-A-N-O-G  45.0 
HUMAN M-A-U-N-H  M-H-N-U-A  15.0 
FAULT  U-L-A-T-F  U-F-L-A-T  36.0 
TONIC  N-I-O-C-T  C-I-O-T-N  31.0 
AGILE  I-L-G-E-A  G-L-A-E-I  240.0 
INCUR  C-U-N-R-I  N-R-C-U-I  240.0 
 
 
* Provided by Tresselt and Mayzner, 1966 (Represents format used for current study) 
Note.  The current study provided a 300 s time limit per anagram. 
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